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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : Case No. 20020504-SC 
v. : 
DANNY HITTLE, : Ct. App. No. 2000712-CA 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON CERTIORARI REVIEW 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted the State's petition for writ of certiorari to review the court of 
appeals' decision in State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App. 134,47 P.3d 101 (a copy of the court 
of appeals' decision is attached in Addendum A). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW1 
1. Did the court of appeals err in finding obvious error where the trial court 
omitted a single word—"speedy"—from the plea colloquy when informing defendant of 
his right to an impartial jury trial? 
2. Did the court of appeals err in presuming prejudice where defendant's claim of 
a rule 11 violation was before the court under the plain error doctrine and defendant had 
failed to assert the requisite prejudice? 
"On certiorari review 'we review the court of appeals' decision, not the opinion of 
the [trial] court.' State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, f 10, 458 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. That decision 
is then reviewed for correctness. Id" State v. Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2, \ 7, Utah 
Adv. Rep. ; State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, f 16, 57 P.3d 1052. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is relevant to the issues on appeal and 
is attached in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two counts of criminal non-support: a third degree 
felony and a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (Supp. 
!The State mistakenly failed to include within the scope of the direct appeal the 
question of the court of appeals' jurisdiction to review a challenge to the taking of a plea 
where the particular challenge was not first presented to the trial court in a motion to 
withdraw the plea. However, the issue is currently under certiorari review by this Court 
in State v. Wallace Dean, Case No. 20020952-SC. 
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1998) (R. 44-46). State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, f 2, 47 P.3d 101. Add. A. On April 
20, 1000, he entered a guilty plea to the misdemeanor charge pursuant to a plea bargain 
under which the State sought dismissal of the felony charge and agreed to a repayment 
schedule (R. 139:1-2). Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, f 2. Add. A. The trial court provided 
the following information to defendant pursuant to rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure: 
Do you understand that by entering this plea today . . . you are giving up 
your right to go to trial; [your] right to confront and cross examine 
witnesses, to present evidence on your behalf or to refrain from presenting 
evidence if you[] wish and to make the State carry the burden of proving 
beyond reasonable doubt all of the elements of the offense as charged; to 
have witnesses brought on your behalf to court to testify, with the 
compulsion of a subpoena if necessary. You have the right not to commit 
yourself unless you choose to take the stand in which case you would be 
subject to cross examination. You have the right to, if you were to be 
convicted and found guilty following a trial by an impartial decision maker, 
or a jury in this matter, you would have the right to appeal. You're giving 
up those rights by entering this plea today. 
Hittle. 2002 UT App. 134,1f 2. Add. A. 
At the time he entered his plea, defendant executed a written statement that he 
understood the rights he was waiving. That statement was quoted from and incorporated 
into the record at the change of plea hearing (R. 139:21-22) (the transcript is attached in 
Addendum C). Defendant waived the time for sentencing, and the court sentenced him 
according to the parties' agreement: a term of 365 days in jail, suspended, and a specific 
payment schedule including on-going child support, arrearage child support, and attorney 
3 
fees (R. 58; R. 139:22-28). In addition, defendant was to seek full-time employment and 
take anger management classes through Valley Mental Health (id.). 
Defendant timely sought to withdraw the plea, arguing only that his trial counsel 
pressured him into taking the plea and citing an altercation which occurred in court 
following acceptance of the plea (R. 62-64; R. 140:1-3).2 The trial court denied the 
motion (R. 110: R. 140:l-3).3 Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, f 3. Add. A. Defendant timely 
appealed that denial, but abandoned the only claim he had made to the trial court and 
pursued several new claims (R. 116-17). 
The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case, finding that the trial court 
committed plain error by failing to mention the word "speedy" when telling defendant 
that his plea would forfeit his right to a trial by an impartial jury. Hittle, 2002 UT App 
134, ^  6. Add. A. That decision included a presumption that the omission was prejudicial 
to defendant and that, but for that omission, he would not have pled guilty. Id. at fflf 9-10. 
Add. A. By order dated October 23, 2002, this Court granted the State's petition for 
certiorari to consider the court of appeals' decision. 
2The trial court briefly mentioned the incident in denying the motion, but no 
transcript of the incident itself appears in the appellate record (R. 140:1-3). 
3A year later, on April 20, 2001, the trial court found that defendant had violated 
numerous terms and conditions of his probation, revoked probation and reinstated the 
original sentence of jail confinement (R. 194-96). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Under a validly-entered divorce decree, defendant was required to pay S275.00 per 
month child support for his daughter, who was born on December 30, 1990 (R. 45-46; R. 
139:12).4 Between February 1, 1997, and April 5, 2000, defendant was chronically 
delinquent in payment of his child support, and his total arrearage at the time of 
sentencing was in excess of $10,000.00 (R. 45). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: The court of appeals' opinion is incorrect because it requires the trial 
court to give a rote recitation of the rule 11 requirements before strict compliance can be 
had. This is contrary to this Court's precedent providing that the trial court may employ 
"multiple means" to insure the voluntariness of a plea. It also ignores this Court's 
precedent implicitly holding that the rule 11 standard is met when a defendant is advised 
of his right to a trial by jury, even absent mention of the word "speedy." 
In this case, the rule 11 requirements were met by the trial court's painstaking 
review of defendant's rights and subsequent review of the colloquy tapes and 
reaffirmation of his belief that defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary. The 
omission of the word "speedy" did not defeat the substantive goal of the rule. Moreover, 
any error in omission of the word "speedy" was not obvious because the decision upon 
4The facts are taken from the prosecutor's recitation at the change of plea hearing 
and the amended information (R. 44-46; R. 139:12). 
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which the court of appeals based their ruling had not issued at the time the plea was taken 
in this case. 
POINT II: The court of appeals erred in presuming prejudice when faced with an 
alleged rule 11 violation raised on appeal pursuant to the plain error doctrine. This error 
was compounded in this case because defendant failed to argue, let alone prove, any 
prejudice, as is required by the plain error doctrine. The court of appeals' position is 
contrary not only to rulings from this Court, but parallel rulings from the United States 
Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals when faced with the same issue 
involving the federal rule. Defendant's failure to include this claim in his motion to 
withdraw his plea in the trial court suggests that he was not prejudiced by it. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DISREGARDS THIS 
COURT'S PRECEDENT HOLDING THAT ROTE RECITATION IS 
NOT REQUIRED IN ORDER TO MEET THE RULE 11(E) 
REQUIREMENTS 
The court of appeals determined that the "trial court did not strictly comply with 
rule 11 because it failed to advise Defendant of his right to a speedy trial either orally or 
in the plea affidavit." State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, ^ 6, 47 P.3d 101 (emphasis 
added). Add. A. Relying on its own precedent in State v. Tarnaxviecki, 2000 UT App 
186, f 18, 5 P.3d 1222, the court of appeals concluded that strict compliance required the 
trial court to detail that the right waived was the right to a speedy trial. Hittle, 2002 UT 
6 
App. 134, <[ 6. Add. A. The court made no attempt to review any other contact between 
the trial court and defendant or any other part of the record that may well have impacted 
on the issue. 
The court of appeals' opinion is incorrect because it essentially requires a rote 
recitation of all the rule 11 requirements in the colloquy and the affidavit before it will 
find that a court has strictly complied with rule 11. This limited review is contrary to this 
Court's precedent holding that the trial court may employ "multiple means" to insure the 
voluntariness of a plea. See State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991). Moreover, 
the court of appeals holding disregards this Court's precedent which implicitly holds that 
the rule 11 standard is met where a defendant is advised of his right to a trial by jury, even 
absent mention of the word "speedy". See State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, 26 P.3d 203. 
A* Rote Recitation At The Plea Hearing Is Contrary To This Court's 
Determination That Strict Compliance May Be Demonstrated By "Multiple 
Means" 
In finding that there was no strict compliance with rule 11, the court of appeals 
merely looked at the oral colloquy and the plea affidavit and assessed that the word 
"speedy" was missing. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, at f 6. Add. A. This is not the review 
established by this Court for a claimed rule 11 violation. 
This Court has placed the responsibility for establishing strict compliance with all 
constitutional and rule 11(e) requirements squarely on the trial court. State v. Gibbons, 
740 P.2d 1309, 1311,1313 (Utah 1987). Prior to accepting a guilty plea, "'the trial court 
[must] personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary 
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and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional 
rights.'" State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 11, 22 P.3d 1242 (quoting State v. Abeyta, 852 
P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993)) (emphasis in original). This Court has "described this duty as 
one o f strict' compliance." Id. (quoting State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 
1996)). "Strict compliance, however, does not mandate a particular script or rote 
recitation of the rights listed." Id. (citing Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 996; Maguire, 830 P.2d at 
218). On the contrary, "the substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know 
of their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead 
guilty. That goal should not be overshadowed or undermined by formalistic ritual." Id. 
See also United State v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, _ , 122 S. Ct. 1043, 1052 (2002) (stressing 
that ceremony not be valued over substance in the taking of pleas under rule 11, Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure) (citing Advisory Committee's Notes on 1983 Amendments 
to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11,18 U.S.C. App., p. 1568). 
Consequently, to ensure that the defendant fully understands the nature of his act, 
the trial court may employ "multiple means so long as no requirement of the rule is 
omitted and so long as the record reflects that the [strict compliance] requirement has 
been fulfilled." Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217; see also Visser, 2000 UT 88, ffl[ 12, 13. This 
includes not only a written affidavit of the defendant which is properly incorporated into 
the record during the plea colloquy, but "'the contents of other documents such as the 
information, presentence reports, exhibits, etc.'" Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 12 (quoting 
Maguire, 830 P.2d at 218); see also State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, fflf 17, 18, 996 P.2d 
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1065, affd 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528. The methodology for ensuring compliance with 
rule 11 is thus not based on the trial court's talismanic recitation of an enumerated list of 
rights. There is no rote script that every trial court must necessarily follow to fulfill the 
letter of the law. Accordingly, although strict compliance is ultimately a matter of law, it 
will turn on the facts of each case. Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217 (citing State v. Hoff, 814 
P.2dl l l9 , 1125 (Utah 1991)). 
In this case, the panel made no attempt to review or even to acknowledge the 
relevance of any other record factors which may have had a bearing on the substantive 
goal of rule 11—"to ensure that defendants know of their rights and thereby understand 
the basic consequence of their decision to plead guilty." Visser, 2000 UT 88, fflf 11, 12, 
17 (affirming use of defendant's "direct experience relative to his right to a speedy trial 
before an impartial jury" and the trial court's explanation of the continuing nature of the 
right). In so doing, it ignored the true focus of the inquiry in this type of 
case—defendant's knowledge and understanding—in favor of an oversimplified 
ritualistic recitation of rights. In this case, the trial judge did not mechanically advance 
the word "speedy." However, he not only took extreme care in making his determination 
that defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary, but he reviewed the colloquy tapes in 
considering defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, and he reaffirmed that 
determination, noting that he took great care in the colloquy with defendant and that 
defendant made it "entirely clear" that "he felt that this [plea] was a rational alternative, 
that he was entering into of his own free will" (R. 140: 3). See subpoint IB, infra. 
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The court of appeals based their opinion in this case on their own decision in 
Tarnawiecki, which in turn relied on State v. Visser (Visser I), 1999 UT App 19, 973 P.2d 
998, reversed by this Court in State v. Visser {Visser II), 2002 UT 88, 22 P.3d 1242. In 
overruling Visser I, this Court held that "[s]trict compliance . . . does not mandate a 
particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed" in rule 11(e). Visser II, 2002 UT 88, 
f 11. Because the court of appeals' decision contravenes this Court's well-established 
body of law governing guilty pleas by requiring rote recitation of the rule 11(e) rights 
regardless of the substance of the colloquy and the remainder of the record, this Court 
should correct the court of appeals' analysis. 
& Rule 11 May Be Met Where Defendant Is Advised Of His Right To A Trial Bv 
Jury. Even Absent Use Of The Word "Speedy" 
The analysis in this case is inconsistent with this Court's decision in State v. 
Martinez, 2001 UT 12, 26 P.3d 203, which impliedly held that the rule 11 standard is met 
where a defendant is advised of his right to a trial by jury, even absent mention of the 
word "speedy." In Martinez, the defendant moved in the district court to withdraw his 
guilty plea, claiming it was not knowing and voluntary. Id. at % 11. The district court 
denied the motion, and Martinez appealed. Id. at f 13. On appeal, this Court held that the 
district court had "strictly complied with the constitutional and procedural requirements 
for entry of [Martinez's] guilty plea," including the mandates of rule 11. Id. at f 26. This 
Court reasoned that "strict compliance with rule 11(e) creates a presumption that the plea 
was voluntary" and affirmed. Id. at |^ 22 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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In so doing, the court opined that "the strict compliance requirement does not mandate a 
particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed. The purpose of rule 11 is to ensure 
that a defendant knows of his or her rights and thereby understands the consequences of a 
decision to plead guilty." Id. at ^ 22. The opinion observed, by way of background, that 
defendant understood his rights, among them, "the right to a jury trial and that the matter 
was set for trial." Id. at f^ 4. In its analysis of defendant's rule 11 challenge, this Court 
again enumerated the rights that defendant acknowledged and understood, among them, 
"the right to a jury trial." Id. at f 23. Although nothing in the case suggested that the trial 
court had used the terms impartial and speedy, this Court nonetheless held that the 
colloquy "strictly complied" with rule 11. Id. at f 26. By implication, therefore, 
Martinez overrules the court of appeals' inconsistent decision in this case, as there is no 
dispute concerning the fact that the trial court advised defendant that by pleading guilty 
he waived his right to a jury trial. 
Moreover, the record makes it clear that the trial court did not ignore the mandates 
of rule 11(e). Defendant's rights were laid out in detail in the statement he made in 
connection with his plea and in his colloquy with the court (R. 56-57). The trial court 
informed defendant of all of his rule 11 rights, including his right to a jury trial, and that 
his entry of a guilty plea would waive those rights (R. 139: 1-29). Add. C. The trial court 
also instructed defendant that the State must prove every element of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt and that trial would be by an impartial jury (R. 139: 4-5). The trial 
judge gave defendant complete freedom to articulate his position relative to the plea, then 
11 
carefully and pointedly made a determination of voluntariness and knowledge (R. 139: 3-
22). 
Thereafter, the trial court reviewed the tape of the change of plea hearing in 
conjunction with defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, having a second opportunity to 
review his initial determination that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered (R. 
140: 1, 3). The judge explained that he went to "great length" during the colloquy and his 
discussion with defendant so that it would be "entirely clear that [defendant] was not 
being shoe horned into this, that he did not have to take that plea[,].. .[t]hat he could go 
to trial on the matter" (R. 140: 3). Defendant made it clear to the judge that "he felt that 
this [plea] was a rational alternative, that he was entering into of his own free will" (id.). 
The court's painstaking enumeration and later review of defendant's rights, as well 
as the court's confirmed belief, after review of the colloquy, that defendant's plea was 
knowing and voluntary, sufficed to meet the requirements of rule 11(e)(3). The trial 
court's procedure was sufficient to ensure that defendant knew of his rights and 
understood the consequences of his decision to plead guilty. The trial court's omission of 
the word "speedy" did not defeat the substantive goal of rule 11: to ensure that defendant 
knew of his rights and thereby understood the basic consequences of his decision to plead 
guilty. See Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 11. 
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C. On This Record. Anv Error In The Absence Of The Word "Speedv" Was Not 
Obvious 
Moreover, any error on the part of the trial court could not have been deemed 
obvious because the trial court did not have the benefit of the ruling in Tarnawiecki at the 
time it took the plea in this case—Tarnawiecki would not be issued until two months 
later. The trial court therefore ignored no settled appellate law when it failed to use the 
word "speedy. Any failure of the trial court to follow a case which has not yet been 
published cannot be deemed obvious error. See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 
App. 1997) (error is not obvious under the plain error doctrine "where there is no settled 
appellate law to guide the trial court."). 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' PRESUMPTION OF ERROR UNDER 
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HAS NO BASIS IN THIS COURT'S 
RULE 11 PRECEDENT AND RUNS CONTRARY TO THE PLAIN 
ERROR DOCTRINE 
The court of appeals did not require that defendant make any allegation or showing 
of prejudice under the plain error doctrine. Despite the absence of any claim of prejudice 
on appeal, the court of appeals sua sponte presumed prejudice simply "because the 
omission dealt with a substantial constitutional right." Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, <[ 9. 
Add. A. Citing its own case law which used the same presumption, the court of appeals 
assumed that omission of a right meant defendant did not know of the right, and "by not 
knowing which rights a defendant is waiving, the defendant cannot make a fully informed 
decision." Id. at ^ 10. Add. A. This decision has no basis in rule 11 precedent from this 
13 
Court, and is contrary to this Court's interpretation of the plain error doctrine and to 
federal precedent appropriately allocating the burden of proof to defendant under a plain 
error claim raised in conjunction with a claimed federal rule 11 violation. 
This Court has held that appellate courts may review unpreserved error only where 
it is plain, i.e., where (i) error exists, (ii) error is obvious, and (iii) error is harmful. State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). The court of appeals determined that the tnal 
court's failure to explain that defendant waived his right to a speedy trial constituted plain 
error, despite any showing of obviousness or harm. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, ^  9. Add. 
A. In so doing, the majority rendered a decision inconsistent with this Court's decision in 
Dunn. While noncompliance with rule 11 may establish error and, in some cases, even 
obvious error, it does not necessarily establish prejudice. See Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 
186, f 15 ("[I]t is difficult to see how the court's failure in this case to discuss the 
possibility that defendant may serve no time and incur no fine [as required by rule 
11(e)(5)] would result in a harmful error"). 
Plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel share a "common standard" of 
prejudice. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, n.14, 12 P.3d 92 (citing State v. Verde, 770 
P.2d 116, 124 n.15 (Utah 1989). A defendant claiming that his guilty plea resulted from 
counsel's ineffectiveness must show "'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 
(1985)), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994). Thus, a defendant attempting to show plain 
14 
error under rule 11 must demonstrate that but for the trial court's omissions, he would not 
have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial." 
In other words, where a defendant claims plain error in the taking of his plea, the 
test for prejudice is driven not by the requirements of rule 11, but by traditional plain 
error analysis.6 
Further, the court of appeals' decision inexplicably departs from established case 
law placing on defendant the burden of establishing prejudice before being entitled to 
prevail under the plain error doctrine. Under this Court's precedent, the claim should 
have been rejected for defendant's failure to meet that burden. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1209 (the absence of any one of the three elements of the plain error doctrine defeats the 
claim); see also State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah App.) (holding defendant's 
"brief, conclusory statement" insufficient to establish the prejudice required under the 
plain error doctrine), cert, denied, 923 P.2d 693 (1996). 
5
 Otherwise stated, defendant must establish that an obvious error so infected the 
plea-taking that the appellate court no longer has confidence in its underlying validity, 
because the plea was less than knowing and voluntary. Cf. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09; 
also Visser, 2000 UT 88, H 11-14. 
6The court of appeals strayed from this analysis in Tarnawiecki by presuming 
prejudice, i.e., that failure to advise Tarnawiecki of her right to a speedy trial before an 
impartial jury "is prejudicial and therefore harmful." Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, j^ 
18. Tarnawiecki should have been required to demonstrate that, but for the trial court's 
violations of rule 11, she would not have pled guilty. Otherwise, omission of the words 
"speedy" and "impartial," like the failure to advise Tarnawiecki of her minimum possible 
sentence as required by rule 11(e)(5), would have been harmless. 
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Both the United States Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have rejected the 
court of appeals presumption in rule 11 cases raised pursuant to the plain error doctrine. 
Rule 11 's federal counterpart includes a subsection (h) entitled "Harmless Error." Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 11(h). That subsection provides, "Any variance from the procedures required by 
this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." This provision 
"rejects the extreme sanction of automatic reversal." Advisory Committee Note (1983 
amendment). Thus, a rule 11 violation "warrants reversal only if it had a significant 
influence on appellant's decision to plead guilty." United States v. Vaughn, 7 F.3d 1533, 
1535 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Barry, 895 F.2d 702, 704 (10th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 496 U.S. 939 (1990)), cert denied, 511 U.S. 1036 (1994). Otherwise stated, the 
reviewing court will "'examine the facts and circumstances of the . . . case to see if the 
district court's flawed compliance with . . . Rule 1 1 . . . may reasonably be viewed as 
having been a material factor affecting [defendant's decision to plead guilty.'" United 
States v. Gigot, 147 F.3d 1193, 1198 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 
1 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (in turn quoting United States v. Bachynsky, 
934 F.2d 1349, 1360 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 502 U.S. 951 (1991)). 
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed itself to this situation, 
rejecting the presumption of error in rule 11 cases raised on appeal pursuant to the plain 
error doctrine. In United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 122 S. Ct. 1043 (2002), defendant 
pled guilty to armed bank robbery, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and carrying a 
firearm during a crime of violence. Id., 122 S. Ct. at 1047-48 (in Addendum D). 
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Defendant claimed for the first time on appeal that the trial court violated rule 11 by 
failing to advise him of his right to counsel at trial. Id. at 1047-48. Add. D. He argued 
that he had no appellate burden under the plain error rule to show prejudice, but that the 
State had the responsibility to establish harmlessness. Id. at 1050. Add. D. 
The Court rejected defendant's argument, holding that a silent defendant carries 
the burden on appeal of affirmatively establishing some prejudice or detriment to the legal 
system before benefitting from his silence at the plea hearing. Id, at 1046. Add. D. In so 
doing, the Court recognized that rule 11 provides procedural safeguards which serve 
important constitutional interests in guarding against inadvertent and ignorant waivers of 
constitutional rights. Id, at 1050-51. Add. D. The Court also noted that not all 
requirements under the rule are of equal importance relative to "the overarching issues of 
knowledge and voluntariness^]" Id. at 1052. Add. D. The Court pointed to the rules 
governing entry and withdrawal of pleas, with their emphasis on addressing plea-related 
mistakes where those mistakes can be corrected easily and on promoting finality "in a 
system as heavily dependent on guilty pleas as ours." Id, at 1053-54. Add. D. The Court 
found that relieving defendant of having to establish prejudice under the plain error 
doctrine on appeal would undermine these laudable goals by permitting the defendant to 
"choose to say nothing about a judge's plain lapse under Rule 11 until the moment of 
taking a direct appeal, at which time the burden would always fall on the Government to 
prove harmlessness." Id. at 1053. Add. D. 
17 
Not only does the court of appeals' ruling in this case achieve that same 
undesirable result, but it does so without any recognition of or attempt to distinguish the 
United States Supreme Court's analysis which the State put before the panel. 
Our rule 11 contains no harmless error provision equivalent to the federal rule, but 
our plain error analysis does. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. Consequently, the analysis 
used by the United States Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit is a useful guide to the 
application of harmless error analysis in the rule 11 context. To show that a rule 11 
violation was harmful, a defendant must demonstrate that the errors significantly 
influenced or materially affected his decision to plead guilty. This is another way of 
saying that, but for the errors, he would not have pled guilty. 
Defendant has not demonstrated that, but for the trial court's failure to advise him 
that the right to trial was the right to a speedy trial, he would not have pled guilty. In fact, 
his written arguments before the court of appeals are entirely devoid of any explanation of 
prejudice. See Amended Opening Br. of Aplt. on Appeal, at 7-11. Not only did 
defendant demonstrate no harm, but he made no claim in his written arguments in this 
appeal that he did not know about the speedy trial right.7 He argued only that the trial 
7In his opposition to the State's petition for writ of certiorari, defendant attempts to 
distinguish Vonn, and concludes the paragraph with the bald assertion that he was not 
"informed of the right the trial court omitted." Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
at 7. This is not a claim that he did not know of the right, only that the record did not 
show that he was informed of the right at another time by the trial court, inasmuch as that 
is the basis upon which he distinguishes Vonn in that paragraph. See id. at 6-7. 
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court's failure to mention it was "harmful as a violation of the very reason Rule 11 was 
adopted" (Amended Opening Br. of Aplt. on Appeal, at 11).8 
Nothing in the record suggests that defendant pled guilty because he feared that his 
trial would not be speedy. Even the trial court did not see this as one of defendant's 
concerns. When faced with defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, the trial judge 
reviewed the colloquy tapes to determine whether he was satisfied that defendant's plea 
was entered into knowingly and voluntarily (R. 140: 3). He then explained that 
I went through this motion with (inaudible) discussion and plea colloquy 
with Mr. Hittle at great length because he was so clearly reluctant and I 
wanted to make entirely clear that he was not being shoe horned into this, 
that he did not have to take that plea. That he could go to trial on the matter 
and he made it very clear to me that while he didn't like it, he felt that this 
was a rationale alternative, that he was entering into of his own free will, 
and that's the basis why I denied the motion to dismiss, I mean the motion 
to withdraw. 
(R. 140: 3). Even upon a second review, the trial court was satisfied that he had 
addressed defendant's concerns and that defendant was acting knowingly and voluntarily. 
Clearly nothing in the trial court's interaction with defendant suggested that the 
speediness of any trial was of any concern. 
Finally, the fact remains that if defendant had raised the issue in the trial court, the 
court could have corrected any problem or clarified the record. It is because defendant 
8Curiously, defendant acknowledged the importance of the prejudice requirement 
in his response to the State's cert petition. He notes that "the only credible issue on 
appeal was did the trial court's error [in omitting the word "speedy"] prejudice Mr. 
Hittle." Response to Petition for Certiorari at 7, n.2. 
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remained silent that the record is devoid of any evidence as to why he decided to plead 
guilty or how the absence of the word "speedy" from the colloquy did or did not 
materially affect his decision to plead guilty. The record in fact shows that defendant did 
not believe the omission significant enough to even mention it in his motion to withdraw 
the guilty plea filed in the trial court. The trial court's ruling presents defendant with an 
unwarranted windfall and continues the bad precedent set by court of appeals cases that 
encourage defendants to intentionally sit silently through the trial court in the face of any 
error in entering a plea pursuant to rule 11, decide thereafter to get out of the plea, raise a 
plain error claim on appeal no matter how irrelevant the claimed error may have been to 
his plea decision, and escape his plea through his manipulation of the system. 
CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals' failure to properly review defendant's rule 11 claim and 
inappropriate presumption of the prejudice requirement of the plain error doctrine is 
contrary to this Court's precedent and injects confusion into the taking and reviewing of 
guilty pleas. The ruling amounts to a requirement of rote recitation of the rule 11 factors, 
contrary to this Court's established precedent. 
20 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
court of appeals1 decision and remand the matter to the court of appeals for consideration 
of defendant's other appellate issues. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /J 'day of February, 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
^2&&*-( 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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GREENWOOD, Judge: 
1^ Defendant David Hittle appeals his conviction and the trial 
court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because 
the trial court failed to advise Defendant of his right to a 
speedy trial under Rule 11(e)(3) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.* While conceding that the trial court failed to 
advise Defendant of his right to a speedy trial under rule 
11(e)(3), the State argues that the error was harmless because 
Defendant has failed to show that but for the trial court's 
omission, he would have proceeded to trial. We reverse. 
1. Defendant also argues that the trial court committed other 
omissions under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and that his trial counsel was ineffective. Since we reverse on 
the ground that the trial court failed to inform Defendant of his 
right to a speedy trial, we do not address these other issues. 
BACKGROUND 
J^2 Defendant was charged with a third degree felony and a class 
A misdemeanor for criminal non-support, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-7-201 (1999) . During a hearing in April 2000, 
Defendant pleaded guilty to the class A misdemeanor, agreed to 
pay all child support arrearages, and agreed to 36 months 
probation in exchange for the State dropping the felony charge 
and the trial court suspending his one year jail sentence. 
However, during the rule 11 colloquy, the trial court failed to 
inform Defendant of his right to a speedy trial. The trial court 
stated the following: 
Do you understand that by entering this plea 
today . . . you are giving up your right to 
go to trial; [your] right to confront and 
cross examine witnesses, to present evidence 
on your behalf or to refrain from presenting 
evidence if you[] wish and to make the State 
carry the burden of proving beyond reasonable 
doubt all of the elements of the offense as 
charged; to have witnesses brought on your 
behalf to court to testify, with the 
compulsion of a subpoena if necessary. You 
have the right not to commit yourself unless 
you choose to take the stand in which case 
you would be subject to cross examination. 
You have the right to, if you were to be 
convicted and found guilty following a trial 
by an impartial decision maker, or a jury in 
this matter, you would have the right to 
appeal. You're giving up those rights by 
entering this plea today. 
Defendant stated that he was prepared to give up those rights and 
agreed that he understood the potential penalties for pleading 
guilty to a class A misdemeanor. Furthermore, the Plea Agreement 
Defendant signed did not include a provision waiving the right to 
a speedy trial. 
f3 On May 17, 2000, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion and this appeal 
followed. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f4 Because Defendant did not object below to the trial court's 
omissions under rule 11, we review Defendant's claim for plain 
error. We determine whether the trial court committed plain 
onnnn-7i o.fA 2 
error as a matter of law. See State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 821 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
ANALYSIS 
1|5 Since Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that the 
trial court failed to inform him of his right to a speedy trial, 
Defendant must show plain error. See State v. Garcia, 2001 UT 
App 19,116, 18 P. 3d 1123. "'To succeed on a claim of plain error, 
a defendant has the burden of showing (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) 
che error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) 
the error is harmful.'" State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 
186,f11, 5 P.3d 1222 (citations and internal quotations omitted) 
(alteration in original). "To show obviousness of the error, 
[Defendant] must show that the law was clear at the time of 
trial." Garcia, 2001 UT App 19 at 16; see also State v. Ross, 
951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("Utah courts have 
repeatedly held that a trial court's error is not plain where 
there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court."). 
Our review of Defendant's claim under each element of plain error 
analysis is set forth below. 
ii6 First, the trial court erred by failing to advise Defendant 
of his right to a speedy trial. Under Rule 11(e) (3) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court may not accept a 
guilty plea until it finds that the defendant knows that by 
pleading guilty, he is waiving "the right to a speedy public 
trial." In analyzing alleged rule 11 violations, we have held 
that "strict compliance, rather than substantial compliance, with 
Rule 11 is required when accepting a guilty plea." Tarnawiecki, 
2000 UT App 186 at Hl2 (emphasis added); see also State v. 
Maauire, 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991). The trial court did not 
strictly comply with rule 11 because it failed to advise 
Defendant of his right to a speedy trial either orally or in the 
plea affidavit. Therefore, the trial court erred. 
1(7 Second, this error should have been obvious to the trial 
court in light of our opinion in Tarnawiecki. In Tarnawiecki, 
the trial court failed to notify the defendant of her right "to a 
speedy trial before an impartial jury" pursuant to rule 11. 2000 
UT App 186 at 1l6. Because the defendant raised the issue for 
the first time on appeal, we applied a plain error analysis and 
held that the trial court's omission was an obvious error. See 
id. at Hl8. We reasoned that in light of Utah appellate court 
opinions requiring strict compliance with the rule 11 colloquy 
requirements, the trial court should have known that failing to 
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inform the defendant of her right to a "speedy trial before an 
impartial jury" was error. Id. at 1l9. Therefore, like 
Tarnawiecki, the trial court's failure to inform Defendant of his 
right to a speedy trial was an obvious error. 
H8 The State argues that the alleged error was not obvious 
because Tarnawiecki is distinguishable from Defendant's case. In 
Tarnawiecki, the trial court "wholly failed to advise [the] 
defendant of her constitutional right to a speedy trial before an 
impartial jury." Id. at Hl7. However, in Defendant's case, the 
trial court omitted only the word "speedy" from the required rule 
11 colloquy. Since the trial court complied with the requirements 
of Tarnawiecki, with the exception of the word "speedy," the 
State argues that the error was not obvious. However, because 
"strict compliance, rather than substantial compliance, with Rule 
11 is required when accepting a guilty plea," the State's 
argument fails. Id. at 1|l2. Furthermore, the constitutional 
right to a speedy trial is a distinct right of criminal 
defendants, separate from the right to a trial before an 
impartial jury. See U.S. Const, amend. VI. Thus, a defendant 
must be informed of this right and knowingly waive it in order to 
enter a valid guilty plea. 
H9 Finally, the trial court's omission was harmful because the 
omission dealt with a substantial constitutional right. See id. 
It is well established under Utah law that we will presume harm 
under plain error analysis when a trial court fails to inform a 
defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11. See, e.g., 
Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186 at Hl8 (presuming harm when trial 
court failed to inform Defendant that she was entitled to a 
"speedy trial before an impartial jury"); State v. Ostler, 2000 
UT App 28,111(25-26, 996 P. 2d 1065 (presuming harm where trial 
court failed to inform defendant that he would waive certain 
constitutional rights by pleading guilty); State v. Pharris, 798 
P.2d 772, 774 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (same). 
H10 The reason for presuming harm is that by not knowing which 
rights a defendant is waiving, the defendant cannot make a fully 
informed decision. See Ostler, 2000 UT App 28 at 125. If the 
defendant is not fully informed of his rights prior to pleading 
guilty, then the guilty plea cannot be voluntary. See id. We 
cannot accept an involuntary guilty plea and still claim to have 
done justice. Therefore, because the trial court failed to 
advise Defendant of his substantial constitutional right to a 
speedy trial, we presume harm. 
on r \ r \ r \ m o .ra 4 
CONCLUSION 
Ull Because the trial court committed plain error in advising 
Defendant of his rights, we reverse and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Pamela T. Greenwoda, Judge 
Jarfn^s Z. Davi£; Judge 
William-A. Thome J r . , / J u d g e 
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Addendum B 
a tpon arraignment, except ror an infraction, a defendant -hail be 
^presented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court The 
jetendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
, b> A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty 
ic) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
,d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise,the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
ie> The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
11) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
i B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial nsk of conviction; 
15) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, an affidavit reciting these factors after the court has established 
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
affidavit. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the affidavit has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by 
the court. 
'2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
(ha 1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
t2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
'3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in confor-
mity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then 
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-tnal motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
tj) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997.) 
Addendum C 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SANDY DIVISION, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v 
DAVID HITTLE 
Defendant. 
Case No. 991401019 
CHANGE OF PLEA HEARING HELD APRIL 20, 2000 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE DENISE P. LINDBERG 
ORIGINAL 
FTCED CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER v *
 Y 7 ^ . ^ 
652 W. Jefferson Cove 
Sandy, Utah 84070 COURT OF APPEALS 
801567,57
 Ste(W)l9-<* 
I >C\ 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: ERIC PETERSON 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
160 East 300 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
For the Defendant: DANIEL M. TORRENCE 
LEGAL DEFENDERS OFFICE 
431 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
* * * 
SANDY, UTAH; APRIL 20, 2000 
HONORABLE JUDGE DENISE P. LINDBERG 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. TORRENCE: Okay, Your Honor, I believe we have a 
resolution worked out here if the Court approves. What's 
anticipated is that in return for a guilty plea to Count 1, 
criminal non-support is a Class A misdemeanor, the State would 
be willing to amend the information to dismiss Count 2 in its 
entirety. I have gone over with him to (inaudible) entering a 
misdemeanor guilty plea including his rights to a jury trial 
and other rights that he would be giving up by entering into 
the plea bargain. We have also discussed the consequence of 
entering a guilty plea to a Class A misdemeanor including that 
the Court could impose up to 365 days in jail and impose a fir.e 
of $2500 to which an 85 percent surcharge could be added. 
Part of our understanding with the attorney general's 
office is that Mr. Hittle would be agreeing to pay back the co-
amount of arrears owing on his child support figured at the 
rate of - which was figured at the rate originally of $275 a 
month. So that what he would be paying, is that he would start 
paying the ongoing child support of $275 a month and in 
addition to that he would pay a figure toward his arrears of 
principle and interest which, based on the figure of about 
earning $11.00 an hour we assume it would be somewhere in the 
range of $272.00, $275.00 a month. We have not - rather 
5 2^0.00 to 3285.00 a month. We don't have that exact figure 
yet because that will depend on the next job that he takes ar.z 
exactly how much his hourly and monthly rate is. That's -
THE COURT: So he would be paying approximately 
$550.00 per month? 
MR. TORRENCE: Approximately $550.00/$560.00 a month, 
assuming he earns about $11.00 an hour at his next job. 
THE COURT: Is he between jobs? What's the status 
there? 
MR. HITTLE: I work day labor when I can find a job, 
Judge. As I explained to the attorneys in the conference room, 
every time I go to work the garnishment is attached to my 
check. At $11.00 an hour that figures out to be $444.00 a week 
at 40 hours. They automatically take half of that on the 
garnishment which is $222.00, taxes on the $444.00 is well over 
$100.00 and that leaves me with somewhere around $100.00 a week 
to live on. I'm behind on my rent. I've had discontinuance 
notices on my electric bill. My gas is shut off. I've sought 
help from the local church organizations and I can at least 
keep my head above water by picking up day labor where there's 
no garnishment. 
MR. TORRENCE: So Your Honor, our understanding with 
the plea bargain would be that the attorney general's office 
would be recommending that Mr. Hittle receive a suspended jail 
sentence and be allowed to continue out on probation for 36 
months and that he, as we stated, cegin paying the S2"5.:: z 
month ongoing child support as well as the to-be-determined 
figure toward his arrears based on his next full time job. 
THE COURT: Well, what I want to know is effective 
when would this kind of payment schedule begin then? 
MR. TORRENCE: I guess that would be up to the Court. 
Our understanding was that would be as soon as he's able to 
obtain full time employment. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hittle, before I accept 
this proposed resolution, I want to review with you what 
matters that counsel has probably already covered with you but 
that are important for me to put on the record. You understand 
that - well first of all, you understand this proposed 
resolution as a way of, the proposal as a way of dealing with 
this matter? 
MR. HITTLE: I understand it as being one of the ways 
of dealing with it, yes. 
THE COURT: More to the point, do you agree with this 
as a way of resolving this matter or do you wish to proceed zz 
trial? 
MR. HITTLE I've been placed under considerable 
duress but I'll agree to it. 
THE COURT: Well, you can either freely and 
voluntarily enter into this plea bargain or we can go to trial, 
but if there are continuing reservations or issues about this 
chen - my duty is to establish that you are entering ir.tc tr.is 
plea bargain from your own personal decision that this is m 
your best interest to proceed in light of all circumstances 
that you're facing. If you are not prepared to accept that :: 
believe that that is the appropriate resolution then I, you 
know, I think counsel has already indicated to you that you car. 
go forward with trial. So the question again is, in light c£ 
all the circumstances do you agree with this as a resolution 
for handling this matter? 
MR. HITTLE: All the circumstances have not been 
brought forward yet at this point, one of which was fraud on my 
ex-wife's part at the time of filing. 
THE COURT: That is a matter for a different setting. 
That's not the issue here. The issue here for me is, you are 
looking at an offer to plead to a Class A misdemeanor in 
exchange for dismissal of a third degree felony with an 
understanding of what the penalties can be on this Class A and 
either accepting the proposed resolution or not accepting it 
and proceed to trial on the felony and the Class A. Those are 
the issues. That is the sole issue before me. 
Let me go about it this way. Do you understand that 
by entering this plea today as it has been proposed you are 
giving up your right to go to trial; you're right to confront 
and cross examine witnesses, to present evidence on your behalf 
or to refrain from presenting evidence if your wish and to make 
the State carry the burden of proving beyond reasonable ::u:: 
all of the elements of the offense as charged; to have 
witnesses brought on your behalf to court to testify, with the 
compulsion of a subpoena if necessary. You have the right not 
to commit yourself unless you choose to take the stand in which 
case you would be subject to cross examination. You have the 
right to, if you were to be convicted and found guilty 
following a trial by an impartial decision maker, or a jury in 
this matter, you would have the right to appeal. You're giving 
up those rights by entering this plea today. Do you understand 
that? 
MR. HITTLE: I understand that I'm giving up those 
rights. 
THE COURT: And you're prepared to do that? 
MR. HITTLE: I'm prepared to do it. 
THE COURT: Okay. And you understand as Mr. Torrence 
has explained, that you could be facing a maximum sentence of 
up to a year in jail and fines including a surcharge of over 
$4600? 
MR. HITTLE: I understand that. 
THE COURT: Has there been any other offer, threat, 
or whatever offer given to you, made to you to get you to enter 
into this plea other than what has been said here in court? 
MR. HITTLE: The thing that disturbs me, Judge, is 
the State refuses to consider that there was fraud involved. : 
understand I'm supposed to take that up elsewhere. 
THE COURT: Okay. But to get you to enter this plea, 
there have been no other offers, no other threats, nothing else 
given to you to get you to enter this plea? What I'm getting 
at is, this is something that you are choosing to do 
voluntarily? 
MR. HITTLE: I am doing it voluntarily because as I 
said before there has been a lot of stress involved, duress. 
THE COURT: Are you today under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs or any physical or mental condition that would 
affect your ability to enter this plea? 
MR. HITTLE: Other than frustration, no. 
THE COURT: Okay. Are you satisfied with the advice 
that you've received with Counsel? 
MR. HITTLE: No. 
THE COURT: Well, in that case, do you wish to move 
forward or not? 
MR. HITTLE: I'll move forward. I've had some other 
thoughts on this and I know of other ways to approach it so I 
will move forward. 
THE COURT: Mr. Torrence isn't going to be to the one 
that is liable here. You will be, so I want to make very sure 
that you understand -
MR. HITTLE: I know and I realize that. 
THE COURT: Okay. He can give you advice but ycu car. 
tr.ocse to disregard it if you wish. 
MR. TORRENCE: If I could request of the Court, rust 
so we determine if Mr. Hittle is in fact making a knowing a:.: 
intelligent voluntary plea, I would request the Court to as* 
him the nature of his dissatisfaction with my service so we can 
determine if that impacts his ability to make a decision. 
THE COURT: I think that's a fair request. 
Mr, Hittle, can you please articulate what it is that 
is the problem? 
MR. HITTLE: He has refused to put certain things to 
this Court that I wanted to put forward to this Court. You saw 
what happened. You witnessed what happened here a few minutes 
ago. They came up with a fraudulent amount, they have dollar 
figures for me and I asked where they got it from, they had :D 
change it. Like I said, there's been fraud from square one ::. 
this case. Right now this seems to be the expedient way to go. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that for me to accept 
your guilty plea, I either have to receive from you an 
acknowledgment that you are, in fact, guilty of these charges 
to which you are pleading or that you concede that the State 
could prove the facts even if you are not prepared to concede 
them, that you are prepared to concede that the State could 
make its case. 
MR. HITTLE: I will repeat that I realize this the 
expedient way to go at this time. I've made the decision and 
Z'11 live with it. 
THE COURT: All right, let me indicate to you 
specifically you understand the nature of the elements and the 
elements of the offense to which you are entering a guilty plea 
in this case is a Class A misdemeanor? 
MR. HITTLE: I do. 
THE COURT: And it's alleged that you knowingly 
failed to provide for support for your minor child, that child 
being eighteen years of age and in circumstances that are needy 
or would be needy but for support received from a source other 
that defendant. 
MR. HITTLE: I understand what the elements are. 
THE COURT: Do you also understand that there is a 
factual basis - and I'm going to ask for that factual basis in 
a moment - but for me to accept this factual basis, it either 
has to establish that the charged crime was actually committed 
by you or if you refuse or are otherwise unable to admit 
culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to 
establish a substantial risk of your conviction. 
MR. HITTLE: I understand it under the way the law is 
written that they have reason to present their case, whether 
they can prove it or not is another story, but they have reason 
to (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Now, you would have to concede that there 
is a substantial likelihood that the State could proceed, has a 
sufficient basis to proceed and establish a substantia: ris< :: 
your conviction and that as a result you're making this as a 
knowing, voluntary determination that this is the option that 
you would rather pursue. That's what's at issue here. 
MR. TORRENCE: If you want to do that, you would net 
necessarily have to admit every element of the offense. 
Your Honor, just for the record I did approach Mr. 
Peterson just a minute ago to see if he would consider a no 
contest plea for Mr. Hittle in this matter. He has indicated 
that the State would not agree to a no contest plea. 
What the Judge is talking about here in terms of a 
plea, you can either enter a guilty plea which would knowingly 
admit that you did all the elements of the offense that we 
discussed here and committed the conduct mentioned, or you 
could enter what is called a -
THE COURT: Alford. 
MR. TORRENCE: - guilty plea pursuant to North 
Carolina v Alford which means that you are admitting guilty m 
the sense that you are accepting responsibility and the 
consequences with a guilty plea because you believe the State 
has sufficierit evidence to create a substantial likelihood that 
you would be found guilty but you would not have to necessary 
admit each and every element of the offense. The result would 
be the same in terms of the sentencing. 
MR. HITTLE: I think that might work two ways too. I 
mean, I can say that I could think they have i: or : can say : 
think they don't have it. That's an unknown as this time. I 
will admit to it that they might have it, I don't know. I mean 
nobody knows that at this time. Not even you know that. 
MR. TORRENCE: The question is do you want to enter a 
guilty plea or not? 
THE COURT: Essentially you are weighing on the 
balance your risk of proceeding with the prosecution and trial 
or opting to take this plea because there is a substantial 
likelihood that they could prove their case in which case you 
would be facing a felony. Those are the issues. That's the 
issue and as a result of that weighing, you've decided that ycu 
are prepared to assume that responsibility for that. 
MR. DITTLE: As I've said I see this is the expedient 
way to go at this point. In other words, I realize that they 
could probably prove the case, it's the way the law is written. 
MR. TORRENCE: In that case, Your Honor, I would ask 
that if Mr. Hittle does enter a guilty plea here today that 
would be considered a guilty plea a guilty plea pursuant to 
North Carolina v Alford. 
THE COURT: That would be the only basis under which 
I could so do it. 
MR. DITTLE: I can agree with that. 
THE COURT: All right. Can I get counsel to approach 
please? 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held.) 
THE COURT: Mr. Hittle, I want you to know that tr.e 
reason I called counsel is that I wanted to confirm with them 
and I want to confirm with you, that this is in fact a knew:::, 
intelligent, and voluntary plea on your part and while I 
recognize your great reluctance to enter this plea, based en 
your last comment I understand those to be an acknowledgment en 
your part that there is a substantial likelihood or risk that 
the State could prove its case, in which case this is your best 
assessment of your options in light of all the circumstances 
and that as a result you are making a deliberate decision to 
proceed this way rather than go to trial. 
MR. HITTLE: In light of the circumstances -
THE COURT: Is that a fair characterization? 
MR. HITTLE: - and the way the law is written, this 
is the expedient way for me at this point. 
THE COURT: And what I have just said to you in terms 
of how I understand what you're saying to me, you agree that 
this, that this is a decision that you are making with full 
understanding of its ramifications and what -
MR. HITTLE: As I understand at this point, yes. 
THE%COURT: All right. I have no, I do not have any 
questions as to your competence to enter this plea, I just want 
to make sure we are all on the same page as to where you are 
with this plea and what responsibility that you are assuming 
ror it. 
2 All right. In light of all that has been discussed, 
3 how do you plead to one court of criminal non-support as a 
4 Class A misdemeanor? 
5 : MR. HITTLE: Guilty. 
i 
6 ] THE COURT: And Counsel, can you please outline the 
i 
7 ! factual basis and support the plea? 
i 
8 | MR. TORRENCE: Yes Your Honor, and again for the 
9 ! record I would request that guilty plea be entered as -
10 I THE COURT: It will be entered as an Alford plea, 
i 
11 ! guilty pursuant to Alford. 
i 
12 MR. TORRENCE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
13 i MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, the factual basis for the 
14 I Class A misdemeanor is that between February 1, 1997 and 
15 November 30, 1997, during that time Mr. Hittle knowingly failed 16 
17 
18 
19 
to provide support for his minor child, Kimberly Hittle, during 
the period of time when she was under eighteen years of age and 
was in needy circumstances or would have been in needy 
circumstances but for support received from a source other than 
20 ; himself or paid on his behalf. 
21 ! THE COURT: All right. You acknowledge those facts 
22 I as outlined? 
i 
23 ' MR. HITTLE: Yes. 
24 I THE COURT: All right, Mr. Hittle, in light of that : 
25 ' believe that the facts support the plea which you are entering 
and I am going to accept your plea as a knowing and vclur.uary 
plea. I want you to understand that by entering this plea, r.f 
of the rights that you are giving up is the right to appeal, 
but you do have thirty days within which you can move this 
Court to withdraw your plea if you give me a good reason in 
writing for that request. Do you understand what I've just 
said? 
MR. HITTLE: Yes, I understand that. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. TORRENCE: Excuse me, Your Honor, for the recora 
I have informed Mr. Hittle that good cause to withdraw his 
guilty plea would be more than changing his mind but coming up 
with what he considers new evidence. He would have to show 
that he was - I'm sorry - he was either under the influence of 
medication or drugs or in someway was not fully able to 
understand and appreciate what he was doing here today. 
THE COURT: All right. 
And you understand that, Mr. Hittle? 
MR. HITTLE: I understand that part of it but I would 
also understand that I considered the fact that there are 
subpoenas out to various employers getting information on 
withholding that are not in at this time and that could 
seriously change things too. 
THE COURT: I'm not sure I follow. 
MR. HITTLE: Withholding. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. HITTLE: Okay, that could seriously change 
certain accusations here. If they come back.as I think they 
might and show that I actually did make *x' number of payments 
'x' number of times. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hittle, all of these issues, that is 
what we are here about right now. 
MR. PETERSON: Your .Honor, the one sense in which 
that wouldn't change the picture, is that if the information 
that we're trying to get from his past employers and the State 
Unemployment Office show that he has, in fact, paid more money 
already than the State already recognizes, then that -
THE COURT: Then that would certainly go toward the 
amount that he owes. 
MR. PETERSON: That's right, that would reduce the 
total amount that he owes. 
THE COURT: Correct. But that does not eliminate 
that, or go toward the basis for withdrawing the plea under 
this charge. 
MR. HITTLE: May I say something? 
MR. PETERSON: That's correct, Your Honor. If he 
needs more than that -
MR. HITTLE: It could also mean that there are *x' 
number of months where payments were made and it's being shown 
that they're not being made. In other words -
THE COURT: That goes toward the total amount of 
money that you would be owing and that is a determination that 
is going to be made as part of sentencing in terms of what you 
owe and there will be information requested that is going to 
provide that. 
MR. HITTLE: That's not what I'm talking about. I'm 
talking about the statute reads that not making any payments 
for 18 months during a given 24-period month, right? 
MR. TORRENCE: You did not plead guilty to the third 
degree felony so that's not relevant. For the Class A 
misdemeanor, all you're acknowledging is that you failed to 
provide support. It's not for any set number of months and 
it's not any set dollar amount. So do you understand that? 
THE COURT: All that that would do is that if in 
fact, you were not credited, you know, with certain payments 
that in fact you did make, that would just go towards the 
arrearage that you would then be required to address. But you 
understand that that would not constitute good cause for 
changing or withdrawing the plea? 
MR. HITTLE: If that's the way it's written, that's 
the way it's written, Your Honor. (Inaudible) much argument 
with that then. 
THE COURT: All right. I am accepting this plea but 
I've got to let you know counsel, I have, I think Mr. Hittie 
has given every indication that he's feeling himself dragged 
into this and yet he is also acknowledging chat he 13 prepare 1 
to go forward with it and I am feeling very much caught in ire 
middle in terms of a determination as to whether or not :: 
accept this plea. I conclude that on balance Mr. Hittle has 
addressed the elements of Rule 11 and he is in fact making an 
intelligent and knowing plea, although clearly not one that he 
feels is fully voluntary on his part. That is an issue that : 
am concerned about but again I think that the question of 
voluntariness doesn't go to any coercion that has been imposed 
upon Mr. Hittle, but certainly, but simply his own sense as zo 
the fairness of the proceedings in which he is - or the options 
that he is faced with. And given that kind of narrow 
definition of whether I'm seeing this as a voluntary or 
involuntary plea, I am going to accept the plea but I just have 
to say and I want to it put on the record that I am troubled by 
this. 
MR. TORRENCE: And again, Your Honor, in abundance of 
caution, perhaps as the Court can request from Mr. Hittle as to 
any duress that he feels he's under right now that has not 
already been brought up to the Court? 
THE COURT: Mr. Hittle? 
MR. HITTLE: Can I tell you a story, Judge, what 
happened to a friend of mine? 
THE COURT: Well, sir, I don't know about any friend 
of yours being relevant to this. What I want to know is about 
1 you, that's what's relevant to me. 
2 MR, HITTLE: This I think you will see is relevant. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. HITTLE: A friend of mine ran afoul of the law 
5 through a divorce many years ago, middle '80's, his name is 
6 ; Paul. He ended up in a halfway house and then got out on his 
i 
7 ; own. 
i. 
8 I I was at the time in a singles group, voluntary 
9 ! singles group providing assistance to individuals at that 
10 i halfway house, Bonneville Corrections, providing transportation 
11 i for some of the residents there. I kept track of Paul over the 
12 : years and some years ago, I don't know when, he was in the 
13 . hospital visiting a nurse friend of his when a judge was 
i 
14 I brought in on a gurney. The judge and Paul got involved in 
i 
15 talking somehow or another. I don't know the circumstances 
16 j there. Paul told the judge of his past and what had happened 
17 j and what had gone on. The judge as soon as he was able, 
18 expunged the record. 
19 ! Now, there are certain things that have gone on pritr 
20 ; to this case here today, that need to be addressed. I 
21 ! mentioned fraud. In other words what I'm saying is a judge in 
22 i the State of Utah is a judge in the State of Utah. What I'm 
i 
23 saying is I feel personally that you can address certain things 
24 that I've been told can't be brought up here. 
25 ; THE COURT: Counsel, can you comment? I'd like to 
near from either. 
MR. TORRENCE: Can we approach, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
(Whereupon a sidebar conference was held.) 
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Hittle, it has been a long 
day but, I'm not quite sure I know where you're going or what: 
you're alluding to. 
MR. HITTLE: I would be happy to take it up at 
another time. 
THE COURT: No. Let's deal with it now, if I find 
that it is something that I can't deal with I will tell you ana 
if it's something I can deal with, then I will. 
MR. HITTLE: Okay, at the time of the divorce, my ex-
wife or wife at the time, claimed by sworn affidavit that I was 
negligent and had made $15.00 an hour. I took into the 
courtroom and I have it here with me today, pay stubs that 
showed I was making $9.42 an hour. That is pure unadulterated 
fraud on her part. She knew better. She intended to commit 
fraud. It's what can I get from the system; how far can I milk 
it? And that is proven under Federal case law California 
versus Serhan, intend is proven when the act is committed, 
okay? She intended to commit the fraud and that was on - and 
this support stems directly from that. I also have -
THE COURT: So what you're challenging is the 
underlying child support obligation that was imposed by and 
1 signed off by another judge? 
2 ; MR. HITTLE: Yes. And I also have with me today a 
3 ! copy of the minute entry by at that time Commissioner Buehier 
4 • but later signed by the judge, a statement or an order I guess 
5 it would be called that I do not make one payment until Z - I 
6 I do not owe one red cent until the defendant, being my ex-wife, 
i 
7 i my wife at the time, verifies all the monies correctly. I r.ave 
I 
8 | never seen that to this day, judge, never. 
9 i THE COURT: Okay. 
10 I MR. HITTLE: Under the statute, I have a right to 
11 j that. 
i 
12 | THE COURT: Let me indicate to you that this is not 
i 
13 i the appropriate place and the reason for that is because child 
j 
14 j support obligations or the other kinds of orders associated 
15 j with the divorce are retained in the jurisdiction of the court 
16 j that issued those orders. If there were problems or issues 
17 j related to that, the appropriate forum for that was back in 
18 : that court with whatever evidence you have or with a filing of 
19 ; request to modify the child support obligation with your 
20 i evidence and the court would have taken, would have held a 
! 
21 i hearing on the matter and adjudicated the matter and determined 
22 j whether or not the child support obligation that had been 
23 ' ordered should be amended or not. I am assuming that you 
24
 : either didn't do that or it got adjudicated contrary to your 
i 
25 ! view of how it should have been done. But, either you didn't 
j 
1 challenge it or it got handled, you know, against you cut 
2 ' whatever may have been the case and in the terms of the 
3 correctness of that adjudication, it is beyond my authority :: 
4 second guess or go back and determine whether or not that 
5 , obligation, in fact, arose or not. I have to accept that tne 
6 j obligation is as has been stated and that it was pursuant to a 
7 ! proper court order that you knew and had had opportunity to 
i 
8 ' address in the appropriate forum- So as to, you know, I don't 
9 : know that history but that is not something that I can take 
10 | cognizance of. 
11 : MR. HITTLE: The last thing Judge Wilkinson said the 
i 
12 j last time we were before him was, I don't want to see this case 
| 
13 | in front of me again- I've filed paperwork since then and he's 
14 ! never accepted anything- I have gone through what you've said, 
15 ; okay, and it's not been heard. 
16 i THE COURT: Okay- I'm not going to second guess 
17 i another sitting judge about a matter under which the court 
18 retains jurisdiction. That is not an issue that even if I 
19 i wanted to, which I'm not inclined to go there, but even if I 
20 ; wanted to, it would not be an appropriate exercise of my...it's 
21 j beyond my authority to do that. But, what I wanted to do in 
22 j terms of ascertaining what it was that you were getting at was 
i 
23 '• to make sure that I understood what the basis of your concern 
i 
24 • was and whether it was - well, I just wanted to understand what 
25 ! the basis of your concern was. I think you've addressed to my 
1 satisfaction what it is that you feel the underlying orcc.er. . 
2 ! and as I've told you, that's not something that I can 
3 legitimately address. All I can address is, I have to assume 
4 that the child support obligation that you were given and that 
5 , was ordered was an appropriate and lawful order and that you 
I 
6 ! failed to follow through with that lawful order of the court 
7 ! and you did so to such an extent that this became a criminal 
8 ; matter. That's where I come in. 
9 | MR. HITTLE: That's your prerogative, I recognize 
10 i it. 
11 j THE COURT: Unless counsel you have some concerns, I 
12 ; do not have any competency concerns. 
13 I MR. TORRENCE: No, Your Honor, I believe that Mr. 
i 
14 I Hittle is fully competent today in this Court. 
15 | THE COURT: All right, if Mr. Hittle could then sign 
16 | the Statement of Defendant, it will be incorporated into the 
i 
17 .; record. 
18 ! MR. PETERSON: And again for the record, Your Honor, 
19 : Mr. Hittle is entering a guilty plea to criminal non-support. 
20 THE COURT: As a Class A misdemeanor. 
21 ! MR. PETERSON: As a Class A misdemeanor, Utah Code 
i 
22 | 76-7-201 and the statement of specific comprising elements 
23
 ; indicates that "I knowingly failed to provide support for my 
24 ' minor child, Kimberly, when she was under eighteen years old 
25 : and in needy circumstances or would have been in needy 
circumstances but for support received from another source." 
THE COURT: Correct. 
MR. TORRENCE: For the record therefore Mr. Hittle 
has signed the Statement of Defendant. 
THE COURT: All right. I have also signed the 
statement certifying that in this Court's view Mr. Hittle has 
entered a knowing and voluntary plea and as I said, you do have 
30 days within which, for good cause as explained to you, you 
can request or withdraw the plea if you make that request in 
writing. 
All right. What - I do have information, I don't 
know that a pre-sentence report would particularly assist the 
Court further in addressing this matter. So unless Counsel 
think it would be helpful to the Court, I -
MR, PETERSON: I'm sorry. We're not requesting that, 
Your Honor. 
MR. TORRENCE: No, we're not requesting that. 
THE COURT: All right. In that case, given that 
there has been a proposed, that the proposed disposition also 
includes some recommendations in terms of sentencing, and Mr. 
Hittle, counsel, you are waiving his sentencing time on his 
behalf. Let me just explain. 
Mr. Hittle, you have the right to not be sentenced 
today, to wait at least two days. You can be sentenced within 
two days from now or forty-five days, somewhere in that penca 
or since we're here now, we can proceed with sentencing. Zz 
you want to be sentenced now or do you wish to come back in t 
days? 
MR. HITTLE: Might as well do it now. It's prcbabl 
going to be the same. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, first let me indicate that 
as part of the plea negotiations and in recognition of your 
plea to the Class A misdemeanor, the remaining count of third 
degree felony is hereby dismissed. 
Mr. Hittle, I am imposing a sentence which for now 
will be suspended but which if we have any problems in 
compliance with the orders of this Court, will result in an 
imposition of this sentence and if I have to impose it, it wi 
be consecutive to anything else that he's holding you at that 
time. So I am imposing a term of 365 days suspended. I am 
placing you on probation with Adult Probation and Parole for 
period of 36 months• You will have five business days within 
which to report to Adult Probation and Parole and make 
arrangements to initiate probation with them. First, and 
foremost is your obligation under probation is that you will 
commit no other new violations of the law and that you will 
abide by all the lawful orders of this Court and any other 
court that has jurisdiction over any matter in which you are 
involved. You are to abide by the usual and ordinary 
conditions of probation by AP&P, of AP&P. It has been propcs 
and I accept that you will be making payment of restitu::::. a:.: 
for arrearage equal and in an amount to be determined and 
provided to this Court. 
How long will it take, counsel? 
MR. PETERSON: We can get that figure in -
THE COURT: Sixty days? 
MR. PETERSON: Thirty days is sufficient. 
THE COURT: All right. Then that figure will be 
provided, but my understanding is that you will be paying in 
the neighborhood of $550 per month. The first payment will be 
due in 30 days and thereafter every 30 days until the full 
amount is paid and that full amount will be provided to the 
court within 30 days by the State. You will be notified and if 
you contest that amount then you can request a hearing. 
In addition I am imposing $250 in recoupment for 
services of counsel in this matter. I am not going to - given 
that there are substantial arrearages and restitution owing, : 
am not going to impose an additional fine. 
I am going to add a couple of other conditions 
because I am - it's clear to me that you still have not dealt 
with this in any kind of a productive way - your own emotions 
and anger over this matter. Accordingly I am going to refer 
you to Valley Mental Health and I'm going to require you at a 
minimum to sign up for and complete their Anger Management 
Program. 
In short, no new violations of the law, 36 ^or.zr.s 
probation with AP&P, you're to report to them within five 
business days. You are to pay restitution in the amount of 
approximately $550 a month, interest will accrue on the 
judgment and so the sooner and the more that you pay, the less 
expensive the cost will be over time for you but we will be 
looking for those payments. You will be making those payments. 
Are those payments going to be coming to the court, are they 
going to go to ORS, who are they going to go to? 
MR. HITTLE: Your Honor, OR has shown me they are 
seriously incompetent. I don't want to deal with them anymore. 
THE COURT: Normally in these kinds of matters, it is 
just handled by ORS, I'm just wondering if... 
MR. HITTLE: I'm objecting to dealing with them. 
I've been there many times and tried to get somebody to 
cooperate with me in the past years. I've written letters and 
they've ignored me. I've asked them for a complete file, 
complete history of this case. I'll pick it up at the will 
call office, and I've never seen a paper. 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, perhaps to belay some of 
the concerns, payments, if Mr. Hittle would make the check out 
to ORS but then send it to our office, then we can expedite 
that. We can make sure that it was properly credited. Ms. 
Hepworth from our office, she monitors probation and is working 
several cases and she's capable of doing that. 
1 THE COURT: All right. The alternative ccula ce ::. = • 
2 l they could be paid to the court and then the court could z'~er. 
3 ' MR* HITTLE: I'm not going to take it to the court. 
4 i THE COURT: If we did this would we have to have it 
5
 ; cut to us and then we could cut another check? 
6 j MS. ?: (Inaudible) 
7 i THE COURT: That's going to again delay. We have to 
8 I hold it how long? Fifteen working days? So that's going to 
I 
9 j create a real delay. 
10 | MR. HITTLE: I would say this. It would not be a 
11 i check it would be a money order or a cashier's check. 
i 
12 i MR. TORRENCE: Your Honor, if the Court were to orcie: 
13 | Mr. Hittle to make the payments, the money orders, to ORS and 
14 J deliver them to ORS or the attorney general's office, Mr. 
15 j Hittle could certainly make a photo copy of the front of the 
16 | money order or check before he sends it in then he could keep 
17 j track of exactly how much he has paid in case there's a 
18 j question later on whether payments were made or not. 
i 
19 : THE COURT: Based on what I'm being told, and I was 
I 
20 j just offering how to do it, but if the policy of the Third 
i 
21 | District is that we would have to hold it for 15 days, that is 
22 j just going to create further delays and further problems, so I 
l 
23 j think that Mr. Torrence's suggestion is probably the best is 
i 
24 j that you keep copies of what you are sending so that you have 
l 
25 ! independent documentation of what has been paid in payments :: 
GRS, but I will rather than have them go to ORS directly, I 3T 
going to have them go to the attorney general's office. Have 
the money orders made out to ORS but to be sent to the AG's 
office - to Ms. Hepworth? 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, for the record, the 
Attorney General's Office is P. 0. Box 104814, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114-0814. 
THE COURT: All right, and that will be provided to 
Mr. Hittle. But it is always a good practice for you to 
retain, to make a photocopy and keep that record. 
MR. HITTLE: I've got pay check stubs from the 
withholding that the employers sent to ORS and they're still 
accusing me of not having paid it. 
THE COURT: Well, that's why I'm having it go to the 
attorney general's office instead of directly to ORS. That 
then becomes another cross check of what you are, in fact, hav 
paid independent of what ORS may ascertain. 
MR. HITTLE: Fifteen days, they've waited how many 
years for this? What's 15 more days going to do? 
THE COURT: Well, it's the accumulative effect of 
delaying by another half a month again the payment that is 
owed, so the order will be that the money order will be made t 
OR but will be sent to care of Ms. Hepworth at the attorney 
general's office. 
MR. TORRENCE: Your Honor, so we could reach 
determination on this of a figure that is the order of the 
Court, the final figure, could we set a review hearing in this 
for perhaps a period of 45 days out so that after I receive the 
proposed figure from the attorney general's office, I will 
certainly get in contact with Mr. Hittle, we do have subpoenas 
out to some of past employers and the State Unemployment 
Compensation Office. So once we get together with that 
information, if we're not able to somehow agree to those 
figures of the AG's Office that might insure that we all get 
back together as some time. 
THE COURT: That makes sense. 
MR. TORRENCE: And the court can determine exactly 
what that (inaudible). 
THE COURT: How about Monday, June 12th? 
MR. TORRENCE: I'm sorry, what time was that? 
THE COURT: We can do it either 9:00 o'clock or 2:00 
o'clock or 1:30. 
MR. PETERSON: 1:30 would be better. 
THE COURT: All right. 1:30? 
MR. PETERSON: 1:30 Monday, June 12? 
THE COURT: Monday, June 12th. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.) 
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Supreme Court of the United States 
UNITED STATES, Petitioner, 
v. 
Alphonso VONN. 
No. 00-973. 
Argued Nov. 6,2001. 
Decided March 4,2002. 
Defendant was convicted of armed bank robbery, 
conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and carrying 
firearm during crime of violence, following entry of 
guilty pleas in the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California, James M. Ideman, J. 
Defendant appealed. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 224 F.3d 1152. 
vacated and remanded. Certiorari was granted. The 
Supreme Court, Justice Souter, held that: (1) 
unobjected-to error in trial court's guilty plea 
colloquy was reversible only upon showing that such 
error was plain and that it affected defendant's 
substantial rights, and (2) appellate court could look 
to entire record when determining whether 
defendant's substantial rights had been affected. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Justice Stevens concurred in part, dissented in part, 
and filed opinion. 
West Headnotes 
i l l Criminal Law C=>1028 
UftkHHS Most. Cited Cases 
Issue not raised below is nevertheless preserved for 
appellate review if made by current litigant in recent 
proceeding upon which lower court relied for its 
resolution of issue, and litigant did not concede 
correctness of that precedent in current case. 
Defendant who lets error in trial court's guilty plea 
colloquy pass without objection may only obtain 
appellate reversal because of such error upon 
showing that error was plain and that it affected his 
substantial rights. Fed.Rules (. VJY^eJRiijes 11(h), 
52(b), !8 l .S . ( A. 
LH Courts €==>85(3) 
I06K85<3) Most Cited Cases 
In absence of a clear legislative mandate, Advisory 
Committee Notes provide reliable source of insight 
into meaning of Rule of Criminal Procedure. 
Fed.Rules Cr.Proc.Rtde I et sen., IS U.S.C.A. 
HI Courts €=>85(2) 
106k85<2) Most Cited Cases 
HI Statutes €=> 195 
361 k!95 Most Cited Cases 
Statutory construction canon, that expressing one 
item of commonly associated group or series 
excludes another left unmentioned, is only guide, 
whose fallibility can be shown by contrary 
indications that adopting particular rule or statute was 
probably not meant to signal any exclusion of its 
common relatives. 
151 Courts €==>83 
100k83 Most Cited Cases 
Repeal of criminal procedural rule by implication is 
disfavored. 
J61 Criminal Law €==> 1031 (4) 
H0U031(4) Most Cited (.uses 
Appellate court may consult entire record when 
considering whether unobjected- to error in trial 
court's guilty plea colloquy affected defendant's 
substantial rights. J:J&lJ*ute 
18P.S.C.A. 
*1044 Syllabus i f N l i 
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Lll The syllabus constitutes no part of the 
opinion of the Court but has been prepared 
by the Reporter of Decisions for the 
convenience of the reader. See Ijli&fiL 
S/-m;N ;;. Jhiroir Timber >£ Lumhcj- tV-< 
:m t..,s. n\% ,u~..2<> sx t. 282, 50 i .EU 
Federal..Rule of C"Hnitnal Procedure II lays out 
steps that a judge must take to ensure that a guilty 
plea is knowing and voluntary. Rule H(ht's 
requirement that any variance from those procedures 
"which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded" is similar to the general "harmless-
error" rule in Bll!£JLllii}- However, IluJbLjJLliii 
does not include a plain-error provision comparable 
t° ..BiLiL.£.!i.!!}.> which provides that a defendant who 
fails to object to trial error may nonetheless have a 
conviction reversed by showing among other things 
that plain error affected his substantial rights. After 
respondent Vonn was charged with federal bank 
robbery and firearm crimes, the Magistrate Judge 
twice advised him of his constitutional rights, 
including the right to be represented by counsel at 
every stage of the proceedings; Vonn signed a 
statement saying that he had read and understood his 
rights; and he answered yes to the court's questions 
whether he had understood the court's explanation of 
his rights and whether he had read and signed the 
statement. When Vonn later pleaded guilty to 
robbery, the court advised him of the constitutional 
rights he was relinquishing, but skipped the advice 
required by Rule (ll)(c)(3) that he would have the 
right to assistance of counsel at trial. Subsequently, 
Vonn pleaded guilty to the firearm charge and to a 
later-charged conspiracy count. Again, the court 
advised him of the rights he was waiving, but did not 
mention the right to counsel. Eight months later, 
Vonn moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the 
firearm charge but did not cite Rule 11 error. The 
court denied the motion and sentenced him. On 
appeal, he sought to set aside all of his convictions, 
for the first time raising Rule 11. The Ninth Circuit 
agreed that there had been error and held that Vonn's 
failure to object before the District Court to the Rule, 
H. omission was of no import because Rule \\jjij 
subjects all Rule 11 violations to harmless-error 
review. Declining to go beyond the plea proceeding 
in considering whether Vonn was aware of his rights, 
the court held that the Government had not met its 
burden, under harmless-error review, of showing no 
effect on substantial rights, and vacated the 
convictions. 
Held: 
1. A defendant who lets Rjlk J J. error pass without 
objection in the trial court must satisfy Ruh_5.2? j>}'s 
plain-error rule. Pp. 1048-1054. 
(a) Relying on the canon that expressing one item of 
a commonly associated group or series excludes 
another left unmentioned, Vonn claims that RjyuV_ 
11 <h )'s specification of harmless-error review shows 
an intent to exclude the plain-error standard with 
which harmless error is paired in Ruse 51 However, 
this canon is only a guide, whose fallibility can be 
shown by contrary indications that adopting a 
particular rule or statute was probably not meant to 
signal any exclusion of its common relatives. Here, 
the harmless- and plain-error alternatives are 
associated together in Rule 52, having apparently 
equal dignity with Rule 1 l(h)t and applying by its 
terms to error in the application of any other Rule of 
Criminal Procedure. To hold that Rule H(h)'s terms 
imply that the latter half of Rule 52 has no 
application to Rule 11 errors would amount to 
finding a partial repeal of Rule 52(h) by implication, 
a result sufficiently disfavored, Ruck eh ha us ru 
Monsanto Co.. 467 i .S. 086, 10? 7, 104 S.Ct. 28^ 2> 
81 L.Eri.2d 815, as to require strong support. 
Support, however, is not readily found, for Vonn has 
merely selected one possible interpretation of the 
supposedly intentional omission of a BillLJLkSll 
counterpart while logic would equally allow a 
reading that, without a plain-error *1045 rule, a silent 
defendant has no right of review on direct appeal. 
Pp. 1049-1050. 
(b) Vonn attempts to find support for his reading by 
pointing beyond the Rule's text to McCarthy v. 
Initial States, 394 I'.S. 459, M S.Ct, flM>. 22 
LXd.2d 418-which was decided when Rjiljiii was 
relatively primitive-and the developments in that 
case's wake culminating in Rule 1 hhVs enactment. 
One clearly expressed Rule 1 hh) objective was to 
end the practice of reversing automatically for any 
Rule 11 error, a practice stemming from reading 
McCarthy expansively to require that Unit 52un's 
harmless-error provision could not be applied in 
Rule- 11 cases. However, McCjinin- had nothing to 
do with the choice between harmless-error and plain-
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
error review. Nor is there any persuasive reason to 
think that when the Advisory Committee and 
Congress considered Rule t\(h> they accepted the 
view Vonn erroneously attributes to this Court in 
H^QiiiilL. The Advisory Committee focused on the 
disarray, after .^cCurthw among Courts of Appeals 
in treating trivial errors. The cases cited in the 
Committee's Notes cannot reliably be read to suggest 
that plain-error review should never apply to Rule. II 
errors, when the Notes never made such an assertion 
and the cases never mentioned the plain-
error/harmless-error distinction. Rather, the 
Committee should be taken at its word that the 
harmless-error provision was added because some 
courts read McCarthy to require that iiuJiLJiliiil's 
general harmless-error provision did not apply to 
IliiiiLli proceedings. The Committee implied 
nothing more than it said, and it certainly did not 
implicitly repeal Rule 52(b) so far as it might cover a 
Rule 11 case. Pp. 1050-1053. 
(c) Vonn's position would also have a tendency to 
undercut the object of Rule 32(e), which governs 
guilty plea withdrawal by creating an incentive to file 
withdrawal motions before sentence, not afterward. 
This tends to separate meritorious second thoughts 
and mere sour grapes over a sentence once 
pronounced. But the incentive to think and act early 
when Hufc 11 is at stake would prove less substantial 
if a defendant could be silent until direct appeal, 
when the Government would always have the burden 
to prove harmlessness. Pp. 1053-1054. 
2. A reviewing court may consult the whole record 
when considering the effect of any Rule \ 1 error on 
substantial rights. The Advisory Committee 
intended the error's effect to be assessed on an 
existing record, but it did not mean to limit that 
record strictly to the plea proceeding, as the Ninth 
Circuit did here. McCarthy ostensibly supports that 
court's position; but it was decided before Rule 
iJiiU was enacted, and it was not a case with a 
record on point. Here, in addition to the transcript of 
the plea hearing and Rule II colloquy, the record 
shows that Vonn was advised of his right to trial 
counsel during his initial appearance and twice at his 
first arraignment, and that four times either he or his 
counsel affirmed that he had heard or read a 
statement of his rights and understood them. 
Because there are circumstances in which defendants 
may be presumed to recall information provided to 
them prior to the plea proceeding, cf. ttoudey v. 
NO N*:d:MJl~<^ the record of Vonn's initial 
appearance and arraignments is relevant in fact and 
well within the Advisory Committee's understanding 
of the record that should be open to consideration. 
Since the transcripts of Vonn's first appearance and 
arraignment were not presented to the Ninth Circuit, 
this Court should not resolve their bearing on his 
claim before the Ninth Circuit has done so. Pp. 
1054-1055. 
J?A.L^d H52- vacated and remanded. 
SOI IFR. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, 
Part HI of which was unanimous, and Parts I and II 
of which were joined by RFHNQt 1ST, C. J., and 
O'CONNOR, SCAU.-V, KENNEDY, THOMAS, 
CIIYSBURG, and BRFVFR, *1046 ~JJ. 
^XE^ Ess , J., filed an opinion concurring in part 
and dissenting in part,po5/, p. 1055. 
Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, DC, for the 
petitioner. 
Monica Knox, Los Angeles, CA, for the respondent. 
Justice SOU IE R delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Government avoids reversal of a criminal 
conviction by showing that trial error, albeit raised by 
a timely objection, affected no substantial right of the 
defendant and was thus harmless. Fed. Rule (rim. 
Proc. 52(a). A defendant who failed to object to 
trial error may nonetheless obtain reversal of a 
conviction by carrying the converse burden, showing 
among other things that plain error did affect his 
substantial rights. Fed. Rule Crim.Proc. 52(b). 
Rule 11(h) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure is a separate harmless-error rule applying 
only to errors committed under Ru.ie.JJ., the rule 
meant to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and 
voluntary, by laying out the steps a trial judge must 
take before accepting such a plea. Like Ryiej^iiQ, 
it provides that a failure to comply with Rule 11 that 
"does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded." RMt-iiiiU does not include a plain-
error provision comparable to Ru|e j^ 2db>. 
HI The first question here is whether a defendant 
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who lets ^ i ^ J i error pass without objection in the 
trial court must carry the burdens of RuRJL~l£i or 
whether even the silent defendant can put the 
Government to the burden of proving the R|iN: J t 
error harmless. JLOl l The second question is 
whether a court reviewing K_u[eJJ. error under either 
standard is limited to examining the record of the 
colloquy between court and defendant when the 
guilty plea was entered, or may look to the entire 
record begun at the defendant's first appearance in 
the matter leading to his eventual plea. 
JL2LL Trus question is rightly before us even 
though the Government did not urge the 
Court of Appeals to adopt a plain-error 
standard. As the Court of Appeals 
recognized, 224 f.Mi 1132, 1135 (C..-V.<> 
ii?fflii» m*s position was squarely barred by 
Circuit precedent holding that any Rule [\ 
error is subject to harmless-error review. 
United States \\ Odcdo, 134 \\M 937, 940 
((.v.*) t(>Q8). Although the Government 
did not challenge Odedo as controlling 
precedent, we have previously held that 
such a claim is preserved if made by the 
current litigant in "the recent proceeding 
upon which the lower courts relied for their 
resolution of the issue, and [the litigant] did 
not concede in the current case the 
correctness of that precedent." United 
States v. t+ifliams. 504 U.S. 36, 44-45. 112 
SXL 1735, MS L.Ed.2d 352 j1M<>2). 
Although there evidently was some 
confusion as to the Government's precise 
position in Odeda, presumably because the 
Government argued there, as here, that 
failure to raise a Rule 11 objection 
constitutes "waiver," the Court of Appeals 
understood the Government to contend that 
"forfeited error" is subject to plain-error 
review. That, coupled with the fact that the 
Government did not concede below that 
Odedo was correctly decided, is enough for 
us to take up this question. 
We hold that a silent defendant has the burden to 
satisfy the plain- error rule and that a reviewing court 
may consult the whole record when considering the 
effect of any error on substantial rights. 
I 
On February 28, 1997, respondent Alphonso Vonn 
was charged with armed bank robbery, under |_S_ 
* .S.C, §§ >H3la) JHU hh, and using and carrying a 
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 
under L^Jiv!-i!<....§ .5.?iu:i- Vonn appeared that day 
before a Magistrate Judge, who advised him of his 
constitutional rights, including "the right to retain and 
to be represented by an attorney of [his] own 
choosing at each and every sta[g]e of *1047 the 
proceedings." App. 15. Vonn said that he had 
heard and understood his rights, and the judge 
appointed counsel to represent him. 
On March 17, 1997, three days after being indicted, 
Vonn, along with his appointed counsel, appeared in 
court for his arraignment. Again, the Magistrate 
Judge told Vonn about his rights, including the right 
to counsel at all stages of the proceedings. Vonn's 
counsel gave the court a form entitled "Statement of 
Defendant's Constitutional Rights," on which Vonn 
said he understood his rights, including the right to 
counsel. His counsel signed a separate statement 
that he was satisfied that Vonn had read and 
understood the statement of his rights. The Clerk of 
Court then asked Vonn whether he had heard and 
understood the court's explanation of his rights, and 
whether he had read and signed the statement, and 
Vonn said yes to each question. 
On May 12, 1997, Vonn came before the court and 
indicated that he would plead guilty to armed bank 
robbery but would go to trial on the firearm charge. 
The court then addressed him and, up to a point, 
followed Rule 1 l(cK3), of .the Feelers 1 _rRules^aL 
Criminal Procedure. The judge advised Vonn of 
the constitutional rights he would relinquish by 
pleading guilty, but skipped the required advice that 
if Vonn were tried he would have "the right to the 
assistance of counsel." 
Several months later, the stakes went up when the 
grand jury returned a superseding indictment, 
charging Vonn under an additional count of 
conspiracy to commit bank robbery. Although he 
first pleaded not guilty to this charge as well as the 
firearm count, at a hearing on September 3, 1997, 
Vonn said he intended to change both pleas to guilty. 
Again, the court advised Vonn of rights waived by 
guilty pleas, but failed to mention the right to counsel 
if he went to trial. This time, the prosecutor tried to 
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draw the court's attention to its error, saying that she 
did not "remember hearing the Court inform the 
defendant of his right to assistance of counsel." Id., 
at 61. The court, however, may have mistaken the 
remark as going to Huh: iHni2), and answered 
simply that Vonn was represented by counsel, f i'TM 2j 
L3i . fillkJJUtliii provides that "if the 
defendant is not represented by an attorney," 
the court must inform the defendant that he 
"has the right to be represented by an 
attorney at every stage of the proceeding 
and, if necessary, one will be appointed to 
represent [him]." 
Eight months later, Vonn moved to withdraw his 
guilty plea on the firearm charge. He did not, 
however, cite IiMJiLii en"Or Du t instead based his 
request on his own mistake about facts relevant to the 
charge. The court denied this motion, and on June 
22, 1998, sentenced Vonn to 97 months in prison. 
On appeal, Vonn sought to set aside not only the 
firearm conviction but the other two as well, for the 
first time making an issue of the District Judge's 
failure to advise him of his right to counsel at trial, as 
required by the Rule. The Court of Appeals agreed 
there had been error, and held that Vonn's failure to 
object before the District Court to its Kule 11 
omission was of no import, since Rule 11(h) 
"supersedes the normal waiver rule," and subjects all 
itilk-JLi violations to harmless-error review, 224 
L M J I i L i155 iC..\.*> 2000) (citing I ruled States 
?T ( » , 154 i'Jd 037 (C.A.V 1M08)). The 
consequence was to put the Government to the 
burden of showing no effect on substantial rights.^ 
LOIi The c o u r t declined to "go beyond the plea 
proceeding in considering whether the defendant was 
aware of his rights," and did not accept the record of 
Vonn's plea colloquies as evidence that Vonn was 
aware of *1048 his continuing right to counsel at 
trial. 224 l-JtL at 1155> It held the Government 
had failed to shoulder its burden to show the error 
harmless and vacated Vonn's convictions. 
Ly.lt As already noted, n. 1, supra, the 
Government in this case did not specifically 
argue that the plain-error rule, Rnle 52(b), 
governs this case; that was its position in 
Q^iItli-^lJllii^L^2: o n which the Court of 
Appeals relied for authority here. Hence, 
the Court of Appeals in this case went no 
further than to reject the Government's 
waiver argument. 
!2I v O . We granted certiorari, 53 L.l..:S._J± 
1185, 140 L.F.d.2ri 102 <200i u to resolve conflicts 
among the Circuits on the legitimacy of (1) placing 
the burden of plain error on a defendant appealing on 
the basis of Bl!i£JLi e r r o r raised for the first time on 
appeal,JjnS4| and (2) looking beyond the plea 
colloquy to other parts of the official record to see 
whether a defendant's substantial rights were affected 
by a deviation from Rule \ I. JFN5J We think the 
Court of Appeals was mistaken on each issue, and 
vacate and remand. 
\-M. Compare, e.g., 224 K3d. a* 1155 
(case below); t rated Stales r. Lyons, 5} 
F.3d 132h 1322, \7.\ (( X D X J00?>7with 
I nited States v. (tainfia-MaYsotiet* 227 
1.3d I, 5-6 jCA.l 20QQ); (nited Suites w 
Basftum. 2~ l\Mt 1174, 1178 (CA.6 1904); 
(nhed States r. Cross. 5 7 P.3d 588, 590 
(C.A.7 1905*; and (fitted States y. 
Quhwnes. 91 F.3d 473. 475 (C.A. 11 1 0(NQ. 
L*2i Compare, e.g. 
with (nited States v. Parkin 
\Mt at 1155. 
>; 25 I 3d 114, 
UX (C.A.2 W 4 ) ; Vnited States v. 
Johnson. ! l-\3d 2%. 302 «V.A.5 ! W ) ; 
Luiu 
rc.A 
t\M 
>d States v. Lav ett. 844 
1
 1 *>88>; I nited States 
1417, 1420
 s C.A. 11 
!=\2d 48 
V. Jotti 
. w>8j; 
7
, 402 
v. 143 
and 
Lyons, supra. ;it 1322-1323. 
Rule II of the l-Vderal R.M!cs.. ot\/J.rhnMiiil 
Procedure requires a judge to address a defendant 
about to enter a plea of guilty, to ensure that he 
understands the law of his crime in relation to the 
facts of his case, as well as his rights as a criminal 
defendant. The Rule has evolved over the course of 
30 years from general scheme to detailed plan, which 
now includes a provision for dealing with a slip-up 
by the judge in applying the Rule itself. Subsection 
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(h) reads that "[ajny variance from the procedures 
required by this rule which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded.'1 The language comes 
close to tracking the text of ByijijL~UL!> providing 
generally for "harmless-error" review, that is, 
consideration of error raised by a defendant's timely 
objection, but subject to an opportunity on the 
Government's part to carry the burden of showing 
that any error was harmless, as having no effect on 
the defendant's substantial rights. See Fed. Rule 
£.fOILJ>n>£v.?.?M). ("Any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall 
be disregarded"); Cnned Stuns r. O/a/w, ,507 X]*S, 
EMlLJ51ili» however, has a companion in Rui€ 
22i^h a "plain-error" rule covering issues not raised 
before the district court in a timely way: "Plain 
errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be 
noticed although they were not brought to the 
attention of the court." When an appellate court 
considers error that qualifies as plain, the tables are 
turned on demonstrating the substantiality of any 
effect on a defendant's rights: the defendant who sat 
silent at trial has the burden to show that his 
"substantial rights" were affected. /</.. 507 ILS.. at 
734~"35, H3 SAX 1770. And because relief on 
plain-error review is in the discretion of the 
reviewing court, a defendant has the further burden 
to persuade the court that the error " 'seriously affect 
[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.' " M, at 736. 113 SAX 1770 
(quoting j-nned States r. Atkinson, 207 L.S. \$^. 
\t*h 5f. S.Cr. 301, 80 L.fcd. 555 (1936)). 
The question here is whether Congress's importation 
of the harmless-error standard into Role 11(h) 
without its companion plain-error rule was meant to 
eliminate a silent defendant's burdens under the Rule 
f 1 X.l plain-error review, and instead give him a right 
to subject the Government to the burden of 
demonstrating harmlessness. If the answer is yes, a 
defendant loses nothing by failing to object to 
obvious liMJllJUL error when it occurs. We think the 
answer is no. 
*1049A 
Vonn's most obvious recourse is to argue from the 
text itself: RuieJ Uh) unequivocally provides that a 
trial judge's "variance" from the letter of the Rule 11 
scheme shall be disregarded if it does not affect 
substantial rights, the classic shorthand formulation 
of the harmless-error standard. It includes no 
exception for nonobjecting defendants. 
[31 Despite this unqualified simplicity, however, 
Vonn does not argue that H u h \J_ error must always 
be reviewed on the 11(h) standard, with its burden on 
the Government to show an error harmless. Even 
though Rule- \Uh) makes no distinction between 
direct and collateral review, Vonn does not claim 
even that the variant of harmless-error review 
applicable on collateral attack, see Sn^.hr r, 
ibruham*ottt SiH I ..V MO, 638. IJ 3 S.( t. PHJ. 
123 L.KcUri 353 HW3>. would apply wherT 
evaluating Rule 11 error on habeas review. Rather, 
he concedes that the adoption of 11(h) had no effect 
on the stringent standard for collateral review of 
BJllLll error under 28 r.S.l . § 2255 i W 4 ed.), as 
established by our holding in (^!itf^L..SlilI£L Hu 
TituMn'ck, 441 l.-.S. 780, 0«> >AX 2085. frO L.r.d.M 
o$4 HO?1?), that a defendant cannot overturn a guilty 
plea on collateral review absent a showing that the 
Rule 11 proceeding was " 'inconsistent with the 
rudimentary demands of fair procedure' " or 
constituted a " 'complete miscarriage of justice,'" ijL^ 
at 783, 00 SAX 2085 (quoting /-//// v. United States, 
368 U.S. 424> 428, 82 SAX 468. 7 iTKcTld ~417 
(l%2)). The concession is prudent, for the 
Advisory Committee Notes explaining the adoption 
°f Rttle *Hh) speak to a clear intent to leave 
Tim wreck undisturbed, LOld ^d there is no 
question of Timmn-cfi1^ validity in the aftermath of 
the 1983 amendments. 
Ih*L m m e absence of a clear legislative 
mandate, the Advisory Committee Notes 
provide a reliable source of insight into the 
meaning of a rule, especially when, as here, 
the rule was enacted precisely as the 
Advisory Committee proposed. See i^xli. 
•Mr cm ft Corp. v. Rulney, 4H8 l-.S. iS}^ <65-
166, n. *>, 100 SAX. 43<h 102 IJ-iUd 445 
(1088) (where "Congress did not amend the 
Advisory Committee's draft in any way ... 
the Committee's commentary is particularly 
relevant in determining the meaning of the 
document Congress enacted"). Although 
the Notes are the product of the Advisory 
Committee, and not Congress, they are 
transmitted to Congress before the rule is 
enacted into law. See Amendments to 
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Rules of Criminal Procedure, H.R. Doc. No. 
98-55 (1983) (submitting to Congress 
amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, including the addition 
of Ruk 1 Uht, accompanied by the report of 
the Judicial Conference containing the 
Advisory Committee Notes to the 
amendment). 
Whatever may be the significance of the text of Rujl 
tlilii f°r o u r issue, then, it cannot be as simple as the 
face of the provision itself. Indeed, the closest Vonn 
gets to a persuasive argument that Rule U excuses a 
silent defendant from the burdens of plain-error 
review is his invocation of the common interpretive 
canon for dealing with a salient omission from 
statutory text. He claims that the specification of 
harmless-error review in 11(h) shows an intent to 
exclude the standard with which harmless error is 
paired in Rute 52, the plain-error standard with its 
burdens on silent defendants. The congressional 
choice to express the one standard of review without 
its customary companion does not, however, speak 
with any clarity in Vonn's favor. 
14j)5) At best, as we have said before, the canon that 
expressing one item of a commonly associated group 
or series excludes another left unmentioned is only a 
guide, whose fallibility can be shown by contrary 
indications that adopting a particular rule or statute 
was probably not meant to signal any exclusion of its 
common relatives. See Pauley y. BethEnergy 
U/Ws. Inc.. 501 l .S. 680, 703. \\\ S X t 2524, 115 
LJ:;<Ud 604 ( W h ; cf Burns w I>//;<></ Sums, 
50tT.S. \1<K \M>~\\\ S.O."2182, MS f..i:<i.id 123 
(iiH>[) ("An inference drawn from congressional 
silence certainly cannot be credited when it is 
contrary to all other textual and contextual *1050 
evidence of congressional intent"). Here, the 
plausibility of an expression-exclusion reading of 
BM.lt? IIjh\ is subject to one strike without even 
considering what such a reading would mean in 
practice, or examining the circumstances of adopting 
11(h). For here the harmless- and plain-error 
alternatives are associated together in the formally 
enacted Rule 52, having apparently equal dignity 
w
*
tn
 JiiiilliiiiOf a nd applying by its terms to error in 
the application of any other Rule of criminal 
procedure. To hold that the terms of Biid*LJL!iLu 
imply that the latter half of Rule 52 has no 
application to Riijc U errors would consequently 
amount to finding a partial repeal of U^H ^ ^ by 
implication, a result sufficiently disfavored, 
i..^i.i:LL..I?iLL^^ a s t 0 require 
strong support. 
Support, however, is not readily found. In the first 
place, even if we indulge Vonn with the assumption 
that Congress meant to imply something by failing to 
pair a plain-error provision with the harmless-error 
statement in JiML.lIi!l2> just what it would have 
meant is subject to argument. Vonn thinks the 
implication is that defendants who let Ij^ JLJJ.. e r r o r 
pass without objection are relieved of the burden on 
silent defendants generally under the plain-error rule, 
to show the error plain, prejudicial, and disreputable 
to the judicial system. But, of course, this is not the 
only "implication" consistent with Congress's choice 
to say nothing about Rule 11 plain error. It would 
be equally possible, as a matter of logic, to argue that 
if !ild.Li2lM w e r e implicitly made inapplicable to 
Rule 11 errors, a defendant who failed to object to 
Rmc 11 errors would have no right of review on 
direct appeal whatever. A defendant's right to 
review of error he let pass in silence depends upon 
the plain-error rule; no plain-error rule, no direct 
review. Vonn has, then, merely selected one 
possible interpretation of the supposedly intentional 
omission of a Rule 52(h) counterpart, even though 
logic would equally allow another one, not to Vonn's 
liking. 
B 
Recognition of the equivocal character of any 
claimed implication of speaking solely in terms of 
harmless error forces Vonn to look beyond the text in 
hope of finding confirmation for his reading as 
opposed to the one less hospitable to silent 
defendants. And this effort leads him to claim 
support in WeOmhy wJ/mtetf States. 3*U j.-.S. 45*). 
m S X t 1166, 22T.Kd.2d J l F f l ^ ' ) , and the 
developments in the wake of that case culminating in 
the enactment of \iw\e 1 HI*?. This approach, at 
least, gets us on the right track, for the one clearly 
expressed objective of Ruk... UCh.) was to end the 
practice, then commonly followed, of reversing 
automatically for any Uuk i l error, and that practice 
stemmed from an expansive reading of Msii'^jltli 
What that case did, and did not, hold is therefore 
significant. 
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When H; 1 l i i i i w a s decided, JI.MI: I ; was 
relatively primitive, requiring without much detail 
that the trial court personally address a defendant 
proposing to plead guilty and establish on the record 
that he was acting voluntarily, with an understanding 
of the charge and upon a factual basis supporting 
conviction. U:Jjit iiiiJ^i^^^Q:„Lii^l;J£X•ll When 
McCarthy stood before the District Court to plead 
guilty to tax evasion, however, the judge's colloquy 
with him went no further than McCarthy's 
understanding of his right to a jury trial, the 
particular sentencing possibilities, and the *1051 
absence of any threats or promises. There was no 
discussion of the elements of the crime charged, or 
the facts that might support it. Indeed, despite the 
allegation that McCarthy had acted "willfully and 
knowingly," his lawyer consistently argued at the 
sentencing hearing that his client had merely been 
neglectful, wni^ Although defense counsel raised no 
objection to the trial court's deficient practice under 
Milk ...Li. this Court reversed the conviction on direct 
review. The Court rested the result solely on the 
trial judge's obvious failure to conform to the Rule, 
uL -At 464, $l> S.Ct, 1166, and emphasized that the 
Rule's procedural safeguards served important 
constitutional interests in guarding against 
inadvertent and ignorant waivers of constitutional 
rights, M.t uc 465, 89 S.Ct. 1166. Although the 
Government asked to have the case remanded for 
further evidentiary hearing and an opportunity to 
show that McCarthy's plea had been made knowingly 
and voluntarily, the Court said no and ordered the 
plea and resulting conviction vacated. 
r:A7, Prior to its amendment in 1975, Rule 
11 provided, in relevant part: 
"The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a 
plea of nolo contendere without first 
addressing the defendant personally and 
determining that the plea is made voluntarily 
with understanding of the nature of the 
charge and the consequences of the plea. ... 
The court shall not enter a judgment upon a 
plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there 
is a factual basis for the plea." 
Vonn does not, of course, claim that MyC.ftjj.hy. n e ^ 
that a silent defendant had no plain-error burden, but 
he says that this must have been the Court's 
understanding, or it would have taken McCarthy's 
failure to object to the trial judge's kuk; JJ failings, 
combined with his failure to meet the requirements of 
the plain-error rule, as a bar to relief. This reasoning 
is unsound, however, for two reasons, the first being 
that not a word was said in ^cLiiUlll about the plain-
error rule, or for that matter about harmless error. 
The opinion said nothing about R»i iojy_ or either of 
the rules by name. The parties' briefs said nothing. 
The only serious issue was raised by the 
Government's request to remand the case for a new 
evidentiary hearing on McCarthy's state of mind 
when he entered the plea, and not even this had 
anything to do with either the harmless-- or plain-
error rule. Under the former, the Government's 
opportunity and burden is to show the error harmless 
based on the entire record before the reviewing court, 
see l nih'd Staff* v. I fasting* 461 t.'.S, I1-***, 3U^ n> 
7, 103 ?>,Q. 1MM, ?6 !...fcd.2d % (1W0»; under the 
plain-error rule the Government likewise points to 
parts of the record to counter any ostensible showing 
of prejudice the defendant may make, see / WJW. 
States >'. >/j//«g, 470 t .S . K 16, 103 S.Ct. 1038, 84 
L,1J.:<1 1 ih>H5). Under either rule, the 
Government's opportunity is to persuade with what it 
has, not to initiate further litigation. Yet further 
litigation is what the Government wanted in 
McCarthy. It argued that if the Court did not think 
that the existing record demonstrated that McCarthy's 
plea had been knowing and voluntary, the Court 
should remand for a further hearing with new 
evidence affirmatively making this showing, 364_ 
t .S„ i\t 46*J> 8<* S.Ct. 1166. When the Court said 
no, it made no reference to harmless or plain error, 
but cited the object of Ru]<LJLi t 0 eliminate time-
wasting litigation after the fact about how knowing 
and voluntary a defendant really had been at an 
earlier hearing, hi., at 46*M7(K 8*> S.Ct, ! 166, And 
it expressed intense skepticism that any defendant 
would succeed, no matter how little he understood, 
once the evidence at a subsequent hearing showed 
that he had desired to plead, hi.* M 46*>, 8*) S.Ct. 
! 16<>. In sum, McCarthy had nothing to do with the 
choice between harmless-error and plain-error 
review; the issue was simply whether the 
Government could extend the litigation for additional 
evidence. 
Vonn's attempt to read the MyCiSiiii Court's mind is 
therefore purely speculative. What is worse, 
however, his speculation is less plausible than the 
view that the Court would probably have held that 
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McCarthy satisfied the plain-error burdens if that had 
mattered. There was no question that the trial judge 
had failed to observe HiiHLJj, and the failing was 
obvious. So was the prejudice to McCarthy. 
Having had no explanation from the judge of the 
knowing and willful state of mind charged as of the 
time of the tax violation, *1052 he pleaded guilty and 
was later sentenced at a hearing in which his lawyer 
repeatedly represented that McCarthy had been guilty 
of nothing but sloppiness. JJKNjli The contradiction 
between the plea and the denial of the mental state 
alleged bespoke the prejudice of an unknowing plea, 
to which the judge's indifference was an affront to 
the integrity of the judicial system. While we need 
not relitigate or rewrite McCarthy at this point, it is 
safe to say that the actual opinion is not even 
speculative authority that the plain-error rule stops 
short of Rjije }± errors. 
FVK. Nor did McCarthy claim that the 
guilty plea should be accepted on the cll£vnl 
theory that a defendant may plead guilty 
while protesting innocence when he makes a 
conscious choice to plead simply to avoid 
the expenses or vicissitudes of trial. Xogii. 
Carolina v. Afford, 400 U.S. 25. K>\ S.O. 
Nor is there any persuasive reason to think that when 
the Advisory Committee and Congress later came to 
consider Rule 11(h) they accepted the view Vonn 
erroneously attributes to this Court in McCarthy. 
The attention of the Advisory Committee to the 
problem of Rule U error was not drawn by 
±i<:ij?il!l£ so much as by events that subsequently 
invested that case with a significance beyond its 
holding. In 1975, a few years after McCarthy came 
down, Congress transformed Riik* 11 into a detailed 
formula for testing a defendant's readiness to proceed 
to enter a plea of guilty, obliging the judge to give 
specified advice about the charge, the applicable 
criminal statute, and even collateral law. The Court 
in IkiJUlhl. na<i, for example, been content to say 
that a defendant would need to know of the right 
against self- incrimination and rights to jury trial and 
confrontation before he could knowingly plead. But 
the 1975 revision of Rule \ 1 required instruction on 
such further matters as cross-examination in addition 
to confrontation, see Fed. Rule Cv\m.?y$>Li. 
I •• ; the right to counsel "at... trial" even when 
the defendant stood in court with a lawyer next to 
him (as in this case), see u^t, and even the 
consequences of any perjury the defendant might 
commit at the plea hearing, see MiliL-JJ-LLi^ J-
Although the details newly required in Ruk [j 
colloquies did not necessarily equate to the 
importance of the overarching issues of knowledge 
and voluntariness already addressed in the earlier 
versions of the Rule, some Courts of Appeals felt 
bound to treat all Kj^ijj, lapses as equal and to read 
McCarthy as mandating automatic reversal for any 
one of them. See Advisory Committee's Notes on 
1983 Amendments to Fed. Rule ( rim. Proc. \\. IK 
LS.C.App., r>> !$(>$ (hereinafter Advisory 
Committee's Notes) (citing Cniwd States v. tloonc, 
543 Y.li\ 1UW (C >\A 1*)7<»; Cnited States v. 
Jvuntct. 544 K2d 633 K\.V2 1M?<»). This 
approach imposed a cost on Rule H mistakes that 
H^iJUihl neither required nor justified, and by 1983 
the practice of automatic reversal for error 
threatening little prejudice to a defendant or disgrace 
to the legal system prompted further revision of Ruk\ 
JM. Advisory Committee's Notes 1568. 
The Advisory Committee reasoned that, although a 
rule of per se reversal might have been justified at 
the time McCarthy was decided, "[a]n inevitable 
consequence of the 1975 amendments was some 
increase in the risk that a trial judge, in a particular 
case, might inadvertently deviate to some degree 
from the procedure which a very literal reading of 
Rule 1 j would appear to require." Advisory 
Committee's Notes 1568. After the amendments, "it 
became more apparent than ever that Rule J3, should 
not be given such a crabbed interpretation that 
ceremony was exalted over substance." I hut. 
Vonn thinks the Advisory Committee's report also 
includes a signal that it meant to dispense with a 
silent defendant's plain-error burdens. He stresses 
that the report cited Courts of Appeals cases of 
"crabbed interpretation" that had given *1053 relief 
to nonobjecting defendants. By proposing only a 
harmless-error amendment to correct the mistakes 
made in these cases, he says, the Committee must 
have thought that the Government's only answer to 
nonobjecting defendants should be to prove error 
harmless, if it could. But this argument ignores the 
fact that these cases were not merely instances of 
automatic reversal, but were cited along with 
harmless-error cases as illustrations of the 
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"considerable disagreement" that arose after 
i/-. « > among Courts of Appeals in treating 
errors of trivial significance. See Advisory 
Committee's Notes 1568. Given the Advisory 
Committee's apparent focus on the disarray among 
courts, the citations Vonn points to cannot reliably be 
read to suggest that plain-error review should never 
apply to K?*k: ?J errors, when the Advisory 
Committee Notes never made such an assertion and 
the reported cases cited by the Committee never 
mentioned the plain-error/harmless-error distinction. 
We think, rather, that the significance of Congress's 
choice to adopt a harmless-error rule is best 
understood by taking the Advisory Committee at its 
word. "It must ... be emphasized that a harmless 
error provision has been added to Rate II because 
some courts have read McCarthy as meaning that the 
general harmless error provision in Rule 52(a) 
cannot be utilized with respect to J£uj£. LI 
proceedings." Id., at 1569. The Committee said it 
was responding simply to a claim that the harmless-
error rule did not apply. Having pinpointed that 
problem, it gave a pinpoint answer. If instead the 
Committee had taken note of claims that "Rule 52" 
did not apply, or that "neither harmless-error nor 
plain-error rule applied," one could infer that 
enacting a harmless-error rule and nothing more was 
meant to rule out anything but harmless-error 
treatment. But by providing for harmless-error 
review in response to nothing more than the claim 
that harmless-error review would itself be erroneous, 
the Advisory Committee implied nothing more than it 
said, and it certainly did not implicitly repeal R»U\ 
5liiii so far as it might cover a Rule H case. 
C 
A further reason to doubt that Congress could have 
intended Vonn's position is the tendency it would 
have to undercut the object of Rule 32(e), which 
governs withdrawing a plea of guilty by creating an 
incentive to file withdrawal motions before sentence, 
not afterward. A trial judge is authorized to grant 
such a presentence motion if the defendant carries the 
burden of showing a "fair and just reason" for 
withdrawal, and a defendant who fails to move for 
withdrawal before sentencing has no further recourse 
except "direct appeal or ... motion under 28 IJ.S.iV. 
ZJl V' subject to the rules covering those later stages. 
LsiL. i*b! * i r ln i -..J*L*KiJUj£}' Whatever the "fair 
and just" standard may require on presentence 
motions, J{• VM the Advisory Committee Notes 
confirm the textual suggestion that the Rule creates a 
" "near- presumption' " against granting motions filed 
after sentencing, Advisory Committee's Notes on 
1983 Amendment to Ll^ - lljjl^illl^ • ?V;i*'- - l - ^ 
* 'X-CMW.v P.> JS}~1 (quoting ijjjKjL^i*!*-!! L. 
gi/r/ur. 514 f .Id 1\% 2\*} A ...VIM J-;T^). This 
is only good sense; in acting as an incentive to think 
through a guilty plea before sentence is imposed, the 
Rule tends to separate meritorious second thoughts 
(say, a defendant's doubts about his understanding) 
and mere sour grapes over a sentence once 
pronounced. The "near-presumption" concentrates 
plea litigation in the *1054 trial courts, where 
genuine mistakes can be corrected easily, and 
promotes the finality required in a system as heavily 
dependent on guilty pleas as ours. 
rM*. The Courts of Appeals have held that 
a Rule 11 violation that is harmless under 
Rule liilll does not rise to the level of a 
"fair and just reason" for withdrawing a 
guilty plea. See I titn;.if,nMtn£s. v. p/v'tvj;, 
llLLdlLZfiLJ7i!?U<^ijiLl(I(LU ("Even an 
established violation of Riile f I can be 
harmless error ... and thus not a 'fair and just 
reason' to return to Square One"); LiiiL^L 
$IM£1Z-J»^ L L ± J . . L 
li>%); (.-,[nfnvf Stales %„ Mamtiez-ihMhtih 
But the incentive to think and act early when R.uje_ 
H is at stake would prove less substantial if Vonn's 
position were law; a defendant could choose to say 
nothing about a judge's plain lapse under R.ujc ! ] 
until the moment of taking a direct appeal, at which 
time the burden would always fall on the 
Government to prove harmlessness. A defendant 
could simply relax and wait to see if the sentence 
later struck him as satisfactory; if not, his Rule I [ 
silence would have left him with clear but 
uncorrected Ruk- 11 error to place on the 
Government's shoulders. This result might, perhaps, 
be sufferable if there were merit in Vonn's objection 
that applying the plain- error standard to a defendant 
who stays mum on liideJJ e r r o r invites the judge to 
relax. The plain-error rule, he says, would discount 
the judge's duty to advise the defendant by obliging 
the defendant to advise the judge. But, rhetoric aside, 
that is always the point of the plain-error rule: the 
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value of finality requires defense counsel to be on his 
toes, not just the judge, and the defendant who just 
sits there when a mistake can be fixed cannot just sit 
there when he speaks up later on. |f Mj|] 
-j Contrary to Justice STEVENS's 
suggestion, post, at 1057-1058 (opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
there is nothing "perverse" about 
conditioning the Government's harmless-
error burden on an objection when the judge 
commits Uute 11 error. A defendant's right 
to counsel on entering a guilty plea is 
expressly recognized in Rate I l(c)(2j, and 
counsel is obliged to understand the Kujejj. 
requirements. It is fair to burden the 
defendant with his lawyer's obligation to do 
what is reasonably necessary to render the 
guilty plea effectual and to refrain from 
trifling with the court. It therefore makes 
sense to require counsel to call a Rule 1 f 
failing to the court's attention. It is 
perfectly true that an uncounseled defendant 
may not, in fact, know enough to spot a 
Hnte M error, but when a defendant 
chooses self-representation after a warning 
from the court of the perils this entails, see 
Htretui v. California, 422 U.S. 806. 835, 95 
S,U.- 2525, 43 L.KcUd 562 <197Sj. Rule 
\\ silence is one of the perils he assumes. 
Any other approach is at odds with 
Congress's object in adopting Rule II, 
recognized in McCarthy v. I nited States, 
y>i CS. 459, 465, 89 S.O. 1166. 22 
J.,K(L2d 4)H (l*w>), to combat defendants' 
"often frivolous" attacks on the validity of 
their guilty pleas, by aiding the district judge 
in determining whether the defendant's plea 
was knowing and voluntary and creating a 
record at the time of the plea supporting that 
decision. 
Vonn's final retort that application of the 
plain-error rule would tend to leave some 
"unconstitutional pleas" uncorrected 
obviates the question in this case, which is 
who bears the burden of proving that KHJJL 
h error did or did not prejudice the 
defendant: the Government or the 
defendant? 
In sum, there are good reasons to doubt that 
expressing a harmless- error standard in Rnu- \\>h\ 
was meant to carry any implication beyond its terms. 
At the very least, there is no reason persuasive 
enough to think 11(h) was intended to repeal Jii!iL. 
52y*>> for every KultLii case. 
Ill 
(6[ The final question goes to the scope of an 
appellate court's enquiry into the effect of a ilulr 11 
violation, whatever the review, plain error or 
harmless. The Court of Appeals confined itself to 
considering the record of "the plea proceeding," 124 
Liik_..£i JJjL .^: applying Circuit precedent 
recognizing that the best evidence of a defendant's 
understanding when pleading guilty is the colloquy 
closest to the moment he enters the plea. While 
there is no doubt that this position serves the object 
of Rule 11 to eliminate wasteful post hoc probes into 
a defendant's psyche, WcCarthw MU i >S.> at 4TIL 
81) S.O. 1166, the Court of Appeals was more 
zealous than the policy behind the Rule demands. 
The Advisory Committee intended the effect of error 
to be assessed on an existing record, no question, but 
it did not mean to limit that record strictly to the plea 
proceedings: the enquiry " 'must be resolved solely 
on the basis of the Rule J J. transcript' and the other 
portions (e.g., sentencing hearing) of the limited 
record *1055 made in such cases." Advisory 
Committee's Notes 1569 (quoting C nited States \\ 
Coronado, 554 1.2d Ifro, 1?0fc n, 5 K .A.5 U>7"Q. 
True, language in McCarthy ostensibly supports the 
position taken by the Court of Appeals (which did 
not, however, rest on it); we admonished that 
"[t]here is no adequate substitute for demonstrating 
in the record at the time the plea is entered the 
defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge 
against him," 3jM (:.S., ar 4"U, 89 S.C i. \ I6<> 
(emphasis in original). But McCarthy was decided 
before the enactment of Ruit i hli), which came with 
the commentary just quoted, and McCarthy in any 
event was not a case with a record of anything on 
point, even outside the RjiitL.il hearing. The 
Government responded to the laconic plea colloquy 
not by referring to anything illuminating in the 
record; instead it brought up the indictment, tried to 
draw speculative inferences from conversations 
McCarthy probably had with his lawyer, and sought 
to present new evidence. The only serious 
alternative to "the record at the time the plea [was] 
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entered" was an evidentiary hearing for further 
factfinding by the trial court. 
Here, however, there is a third source of 
information, outside the four corners of the transcript 
of the plea hearing and &KW J J colloquy, but still 
part of the record. Transcripts brought to our 
attention show that Vonn was advised of his right to 
trial counsel during his initial appearance before the 
Magistrate Judge and twice at his first arraignment. 
The record shows that four times either Vonn or his 
counsel affirmed that Vonn had heard or read a 
statement of his rights and understood what they 
were. Because there are circumstances in which 
defendants may be presumed to recall information 
provided to them prior to the plea proceeding, cf. 
fhHistt'Y v. f-tnk'tf Sniffs, 5Z3 I..S. ft 14, H 8 , 118 
S.Ct.- n>04. 140 i .JuUd S28 (f*>98) (a defendant 
with a copy of his indictment before pleading guilty 
is presumed to know the nature of the charge against 
him), the record of Vonn's initial appearance and 
arraignment is relevant in fact, and well within the 
Advisory Committee's understanding of "other 
portions ... of the limited record" that should be open 
to consideration. It may be considered here. 
The transcripts covering Vonn's first appearance and 
arraignment were not, however, presented to the 
Court of Appeals. Probably owing to that court's 
self-confinement to a narrower record, it made no 
express ruling on the part of the Government's 
rehearing motion requesting to make the first-
appearance and arraignment transcripts part of the 
appellate record. For that reason, even with the 
transcripts now in the parties' joint appendix filed 
with us, we should not resolve their bearing on 
Vonn's claim before the Court of Appeals has done 
SO. AisiiT'ittiil (.*vn*tmct<irs. fnc. v. Mhu-tn. 5M jj.S, 
103. 122 S.Ct. 511, 151-L.Kd.2d 439(200!)-
We therefore vacate the Court of Appeals's judgment 
and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
// is so ordered. 
Justice % It \ O s , concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
For the reasons stated in Part III of the Court's 
opinion, I agree that the effect of a violation of -
 ;<M 
; l •*£.jj.H'... t*^l^j ' ; y B<Kv> .'•* *• ::-"^:)-- • — - ' h n v 
should be evaluated on the basis of the entire record, 
rather than just the record of the plea colloquy, and 
that a remand is therefore required. Contrary to the 
Court's analysis in Part II of its opinion, however, I 
am firmly convinced that the history, the text of fc*»k-
*J, and the special office of the Rule all support the 
conclusion, "urged by the Government" in cLldHli}:.. 
22 i...r.iUd 418 H ^ t h , that the burden of 
demonstrating that a violation of that Rule is 
harmless is "place [d] upon the Government," >frjjj: 
*1056 In }iciAi:!llXi a f t e r deciding that the trial 
judge had not complied with \ln\^ H_, the Court had 
to "determine the effect of that noncompliance, an 
issue that ha[d] engendered a sharp difference ... 
among the courts of appeals." /?A ;§r f'^< Js- M ? 
Liill The two alternatives considered by those 
courts were the automatic reversal rule that we 
ultimately unanimously endorsed in */*.-( 'arrhy and 
the harmless-error rule urged by the Government. 
jl-'M 1 No one even argued that the defendant should 
have the burden of proving prejudice. |j;JNJi The 
Court's conclusion that "prejudice inheres in a failure 
to comply with Ruk- 11" was uncontroversial. J IN j j 
A/.,ar 471,80 S.Ct. \\M>. 
L-iL McCarthy was decided 15 years after 
the adoption of Elik.2:A> a nd v e t neither the 
parties nor the Court discussed the 
application of that Rule despite the fact that 
the defendant had failed to object to the 
Rule 11 error. 
KN2. Nor did the Government make such an 
argument in the Court of Appeals in this 
case. That should be a sufficient reason for 
refusing to consider the argument here, see 
M , " l l 2 S.O> IT.VS, V*H L.EiUd 352 
(1<>92) (STEVENS, J., dissenting), but, as in 
}Mljoi*Z!i* t n e Court finds it appropriate to 
accord "a special privilege for the Federal 
Government," Mr.-»....lLi.:-.-: lil^LLJJM.:. 
hiih "We thus conclude that prejudice 
inheres in a failure to comply with Upu U, 
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for noncompliance deprives the defendant of 
the Rule's procedural safeguards that are 
designed to facilitate a more accurate 
determination of the voluntariness of his 
P lea-" M<:C'itrfhr >-, i'nited Sin a -v. W t ..S, 
l!Aiil'l?5i- Not a word in the proceedings 
that led to the amendment rejecting the 
automatic reversal remedy questioned the 
validity of the proposition that every 
violation of the Rule is presumptively 
prejudicial. The amendment merely gives 
the Government the opportunity to 
overcome that presumption. 
reviews for plain error, the burden is on the 
defendant to show that the error affected his 
substantial rights. {jjjJ^LJS/ilIi:^x- (l:^:l:<. 
?i!.li:.A- —*;: T ^" 7 ^J i i . . :M.J* * ' *^  '•-••* 
EM.* BiikJy^iiii states: "Harmless error. 
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which does not affect substantial rights shall 
be disregarded." B*lk VJJll states: 
"Harmless error. Any variance from the 
procedures required by this rule which does 
not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded." 
During the years preceding the 1983 amendment to 
Ruk 11, it was generally understood that 
noncompliance with Ruk i 1 in direct appeal cases 
required automatic reversal. See Advisory 
Committee's Notes on 1983 Amendments to jH>yL 
Rule Crim.- IVoy. U, \H IJ.S.C/..-\|HJ.» n. (5t>8 
(hereinafter Advisory Committee's Notes) (citing 
I'ttited States v. Hootu\ 543 F.2d MNO tC.A.4 
!M7<>' i fined States w Jaurncu 544 1.2(1 (>*J 
(CA.2 V)l<>\). Thus, prior to the addition of Kale 
I lihh neither plain-error .LOU n o r harmless- error 
review applied to Rule II violations. Rejecting 
Msi£jElhLl "extreme sanction of automatic reversal" 
for technical violations, Congress added subsection 
11(h), which closely tracks the harmless-error 
language of Rule 52(a). jFNSj Advisory 
Committee's Notes 1569. As the Advisory 
Committee's Notes make clear, "Subdivision (h) 
makes no change in the responsibilities of the judge 
a t
 K»l*- 1 - proceedings, but instead merely rejects the 
extreme sanction of automatic reversal." Ibid, 
(emphasis deleted and added). The plain text thus 
embodies Congress' choice of incorporating the 
standard found in Rule 52(a), while omitting that of 
Rule 52H>). (FNft| Because the pre-existing 
background of Rule I \ was that Rule 52(b) did not 
apply, and because the *1057 amendment adding 
Huh: ?U:\) via subsection (h) did not also add Rule 
?iii>i> the straightforward conclusion is that plain-
error review does not apply to Rule 11 errors. 
L^L R*JNV 52(b) states: "Plain errors or 
defects affecting substantial rights may be 
noticed although they were not brought to 
the attention of the court." When a court 
LM(J. The Court incorrectly asserts that this 
is an argument for repeal by implication of 
Ruk 52ih?. Ante, at 1050 ("To hold that the 
terms of Rule 11(h) imply that the latter half 
°f K.M.Je $2 has no application to R u i i J l 
errors would consequently amount to of 
finding a partial repeal of R|*Ul..5Ji!>j by 
implication, a result sufficiently 
disfavored"). This ignores the fact that 
prior to the enactment of Rule I hit), courts 
applied neither Rule 52(a) nor (b) to Rujc 
11 violations. 
Congress' decision to apply only Rule 52j;u's 
harmless-error standard to Rule 11 errors is tailored 
to the purpose of the Rule. The very premise of the 
required Rule 11 colloquy is that, even if counsel is 
present, the defendant may not adequately understand 
the rights set forth in the Rule unless the judge 
explains them. It is thus perverse to place the 
burden on the uninformed defendant to object to 
deviations from RjyjiHM or to establish prejudice 
arising out of the judge's failure to mention a right 
that he does not know he has.J_FY7j[ Under the 
Court's approach, the Government bears the burden 
of establishing no harm only when the defendant 
objects to the district court's failure to inform him. 
In other words, the Government must show prejudice 
only when the defendant asks the judge to advise him 
of a right of which the RuleJ± colloquy assumes he 
is unaware. To see the implausibility of this, 
imagine what such an objection would sound like: 
"Your Honor, I object to your failure to inform me of 
my right to assistance of counsel if I proceed to trial." 
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; \
 : The Court states that this is like any 
other application of the plain-error rule as it 
is applied to all trial errors. Ante, at 1054 
("The plain-error rule, [Vonn] says, would 
discount the judge's duty to advise the 
defendant by obliging the defendant to 
advise the judge. But, rhetoric aside, that is 
always the point of the plain-error rule ..."). 
Unlike most rules that apply to a trial, 
however, the special purpose of the K \}k_±j. 
colloquy is to provide information to a 
defendant prior to accepting his plea. 
Given this purpose, it is inconceivable that 
Congress intended the same rules for review 
of noncompliance to apply. A parallel 
example from the self-representation context 
illustrates this point. Pursuant to Farina w 
CatyhniM. 422 iJ.S. 80c»rj>5 S.( t. 2S25, 45 
L„LlLllL_5.(!l^i2Ji!» a defendant who 
wishes to represent himself must "be made 
aware of the dangers and disadvantages of 
se 1 f-representation," uF jit..835, *>5 .frX-V,, 
.2525. Assume a defendant states that he 
wishes to proceed pro se, and the trial judge 
makes no attempt to warn the defendant of 
the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation. If the defendant makes no 
objection to the trial court's failure to warn, 
surely we would not impose a plain-error 
review standard upon this nonobjecting 
defendant. This is so because the 
assumption of Fareifa's warning 
requirement is that the defendant is unaware 
of the dangers. It is illogical in this context, 
a s m t n e
 Rate * * context, to require the 
presumptively unknowing defendant to 
object to the court's failure to adequately 
inform. Congress' decision to apply the 
harmless-error standard to all Ruh 11 errors 
surely reflects this logic. 
failing to object to obvious £tliilJLi error when it 
occurs"); ante, at 1054 ("[A] defendant could choose 
to say nothing about a judge's plain lapse under K<;v 
! j until the moment of taking a direct appeal, at 
which time the burden would always fall on the 
Government to prove harmlessness. A defendant 
could simply relax and wait to see if the sentence 
later struck him as satisfactory"). My analysis is 
based on a fundamentally different understanding of 
the considerations that motivated the Kjjjc Li 
colloquy requirements in the first place. Namely, in 
light of the gravity of a plea, the court will assume no 
knowledge on the part of the defendant, even if 
represented by counsel, and the court must inform 
him of a base level of information before accepting 
his plea.JHVH 
£N8. See Kevthwul 
r.s. i2 
l niivd Shift.' 
JL4? S.O. 582. 71 L.fcd. 
(1^2?) ("A plea of guilty differs in purpose 
and effect from a mere admission or an extra-
judicial confession; it is itself a 
conviction.... Out of just consideration for 
persons accused of crime, courts are careful 
that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted 
unless made voluntarily after proper advice 
and with full understanding of the 
consequences"). 
*1058 The express inclusion in g.ul£.._..!.i of a 
counterpart to Rule 52(a) and the omission of a 
counterpart to Rule 52(h) is best understood as a 
reflection of the fact that it is only fair to place the 
burden of proving the impact of the judge's error on 
the party who is aware of it rather than the party who 
is unaware of it. This burden allocation gives 
incentive to the judge to follow meticulously the 
Hyil.II requirements and to the prosecutor to correct 
Rule 1 j errors at the time of the colloquy. The 
Court's approach undermines those incentives. 
Despite this implausible scenario, and to support the 
result that it reaches, the Court's analysis relies upon 
an image of a cunning defendant, who is fully 
knowledgeable of his rights, and who games the 
system by sitting silently as the district court, 
apparently less knowledgeable than the defendant, 
slips up in following the dictates of Huk^IJ. See, 
e.g., ante, at 1048 ("[A] defendant loses nothing by 
I would remand to the Court of Appeals to determine 
whether, taking account of the entire record, the 
Government has met its burden of establishing that 
the District Court's failure to inform the respondent 
of his right to counsel at trial was harmless. 
Hrlvh \uu\ Other Rdafcd Hon*menh iiuici* 
I o p } 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
For U.S. Supreme Court Briefs See: 
Page 15 
M*\ lLLJ^^i5iLi££Li>iM)» BRIEF FOR THE 
UNITED STATES, (May 9, 2001) 
200! Wl. <>*07U (KepK.Brieh, REPLY BRIEF 
FOR THE UNITED STATES, (August 15, 2001) 
?W 1M- /*>llLOllAmicus.«JHcf}, BRIEF FOR 
THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE LAWYERS AND THE NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF FEDERAL DEFENDERS AS 
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT, 
(July 13,2001) 
For Transcript of Oral Argument See: 
2001 WL 141 !U4 {VSA)RAL.ARG.), Oral 
Argument, (November 6, 2001) 
122 S.Ct. 1043, 535 U.S. 55, 152 L.Ed.2d 90, 70 
USLW 4181, 2 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2007, 2002 
Daily Journal D.A.R. 2447, 15 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 
145 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
